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I. INTRODUCTION

This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida.' Although this article will focus primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1996, and June 30, 1997, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period which are either of
particular interest to the appellate practitioner or which provide the
background for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases

decided during that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of

appellate practice.

Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,

however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those
substantive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this

article will focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and
1. For a discussion of developments in appellate practice for 1993, 1995, and 1996, see
Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1996 Survey of FloridaLaw, 21 NOvA L. REv. 13
(1996) [hereinafter 1996 Survey]; Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1995 Survey of
Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Survey]; Anthony C. Musto,
Appellate Practice: 1993 Survey of FloridaLaw, 18 NoVA L. Rav. 1 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 Survey].
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will deal with those areas. Additionally, this article will not discuss cases
relating to the preservation of issues, nor the question of whether particular
errors were harmless.
II. FOUR-YEAR CYCLE AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE

The most significant development in the field of appellate practice in
Florida, during the 1996-97 year, was the four-year cycle revision of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.2 As is the case with each set of
Florida court rules, revisions occur every four years pursuant to the cycle
established by rule 2.130(c) of the FloridaRules ofJudicialAdministration.3
Proposals are submitted by the Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee to
the Supreme Court of Florida, which adopts such portions of the proposals
as it deems appropriate. The numerous changes that resulted from this
process were initially
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida on
4••
November 22, 1996,. were corrected on denial of rehearing on December 26,
1996, 5 and took effect on January 1, 1997.
A.

Rule 9. 010: Effective Date and Scope

This rule was amended to state that the appellate rules, as provided in
rule 2.135 of the Florida Rules of JudicialAdministration, shall supersede
all conflicting rules of procedure. It is likely that the most significant impact
of this change will be to require circuit courts, considering requests for
extraordinary writs that do not involve the submission of evidence or
testimony to follow the procedure set forth by rule 9.100 of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure,rather than that contained in rule 1.630 of the
FloridaRules of Civil Procedure.

2. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.
1996).
3. FLA. R. JuD. ADMrN. 2.130(c).
4. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d at 1103.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. As part of its four-year cycle review of the rules of judicial administration, the court
adopted new rule 2.135, which states: "The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure shall
control all proceedings in the supreme court and the district courts, and all proceedings in
which the circuit courts exercise their appellate jurisdiction, nothwithstanding any conflicting
rules of procedure." Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, 682 So. 2d
89, 103 (Fla. 1996).
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B.

Rule 9.020: Definitions

The court defined "Family Law Matter" as "[a] matter governed by the
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure,",8 and amended the definition of
"Lower Tribunal" to include a "judge of compensation claims... whose
order is to be reviewed." 9 The court also added to the list of authorized and
timely motions that delay rendition of orders, a motion to withdraw a plea
after sentencing pursuant to rule 3.170(l) of the FloridaRules of Criminal
Procedure.'0 The reference to one of the motions already included in the
rule, a motion to correct a sentence or order of probation, was amended to
make clear that in order to delay rendition, such motion had to be made
pursuant to rule 3.800(b) of the FloridaRules of CriminalProcedure."
Another amendment to the rule provides that when a notice of appeal is
filed during the pendency of a motion to correct a sentence, or order of
probation, or a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing, the notice "shall
be treated as prematurely filed and the appeal held in abeyance until the
filing of a signed, written order disposing of such motion. 12 A new
provision was created to provide:
An order based upon the recommendation of a hearing officer in
accordance with Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.492
shall not be deemed rendered if there has been filed in the lower
tribunal an authorized and timely motion to vacate1 3until the filing
of a signed, written order disposing of such motion.
C.

Rule 9.100: OriginalProceedings

The references to "common law certiorari" were changed to simply
"certiorari" in order to make clear that the thirty-day time limit for instituting
a proceeding applies to all petitions for certiorari. Also,15 past references to
"administrative" action were changed to "agency" action.
Added to the list of petitions that must be filed within thirty days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed in order to be timely were petitions

8. FIA. R. APP. P.9.020(d).
9. Id. 9.020(e).

10. Id 9.020(h).

11. Id.
12. Id. 9.020(h)(3).
13. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(i).
14. See 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100.
15. FLA. R. App. P.9.100(c).
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challenging orders
of the Department of Corrections in prisoner disciplinary
16
proceedings.
A new subdivision of the rule sets forth the procedures to be followed
with regard
to petitions
for
•
•
17 writs of mandamus and prohibition directed to a
judge or lower tribunal. The procedures provide that "[t]he name of the
judge or lower tribunal shall be omitted from the caption," which shall
instead "bear the name of the petitioner" and which shall name the "other
parties to the proceeding in the lower tribunal" as respondents. The judge or
lower tribunal must be named as a formal party in the body of the petition,
which must be served on all parties, including the judge, who are formal
parties.
The rule makes clear that "[t]he responsibility to respond to an
order to show cause is that of the litigant opposing the relief requested in the
petition. Unless otherwise specifically ordered, the judge or lower tribunal
has no obligation to file a response" but retains the discretion to do so.19
"The absence of a separate response•., shall not be deemed to admit the
allegations of the petition." 20
2
Another new subdivision2 ' establishes additional requirements for
proceedings invoking the jurisdiction of the circuit court to review judicial
or quasi-judicial action.22 The caption of a petition seeking such review
must contain a statement that the petition is being filed pursuant to the
subdivision.23 When such a petition is filed, "the circuit court clerk shall
forthwith transmit" it to the appropriate judge or judges "for a determination
as to whether an order to show cause should be issued. 2 4 The clerk shall
not enter a default
in a case in which the petition is filed pursuant to the
25
subdivision.
D. Rule 9.110: Appeal Proceedingsto Review Final Ordersof Lower
Tribunals and OrdersGrantingNew Trial in Jury and Non-Jury Cases
The rule was amended to indicate its applicability to proceedings that
"seek review of orders entered in probate and guardianship matters that

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. 9.100(c)(4).
Id. 9.100(e).
Id. 9.100(e)(2).
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(e)(3).

20. Id.
21. Id. 9.100(f).
22. Id. 9.100(f)(1).
23. Id. 9.100(f)(2).

24.

FLA.

R. APP. P. 9.100(f(3).

25. Id. 9.100(f)(4).
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finally determine a right or26 obligation of an interested person as defined in
the Florida Probate Code."
Another amendment provides that in an appeal of an administrative
order:
[T]he appellant shall file the original notice [of appeal] with the
clerk of the lower administrative tribunal within 30 days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed, and file a copy of the notice,
accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of
the [appellate] court.27
A new subdivision of the rule states that "[j]udgments that determine the
existence or nonexistence of insurance coverage in cases in which a claim
has been made against an insured and coverage thereof is disputed by the
insurer may be reviewed either by the method prescribed in this rule or that
in rule 9.130, '28 the rule governing proceedings to review non-final orders.
This subdivision was a response to the opinion in Canal Insurance Co. v.
Reed,2 9 which suggested that the Appellate Court Rules Committee consider
an appropriate method for providing expedited review in this type of case in
order to avoid unnecessary delays in the final resolution of the underlying
actions.30
E.

Rule 9.130: Proceedingsto Review Non-Final Orders

The court adopted an amendment that shifted a phrase used in setting
forth one of the rule's appealable non-final orders. The old version of the
rule provided for review of non-final orders that determined "that a party is
not entitled to workers' compensation immunity as a matter of law."31 The
new version refers instead to non-final orders which determine "that, as a
matter of law, a party is not entitled to workers' compensation immunity. 32
This change was made to resolve the confusion evidenced in Breakers Palm
Beach, Inc. v. Gloger,33 City of Lake Mary v. Franklin,34 and their progeny
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id 9.110(a)(2).
Id 9.110(c).
Id 9.110(n).
666 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1996). For a discussion of the decision in Canal Insurance,

see 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 25-26.
30. See 1996 Committee Note to FLA.

R. App. P. 9.110.

31. RA R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi) (amended 1996).
32. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi).
33. 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). For a discussion of the decision in
BreakersPalm Beach, see 1995 Survey, supra note 1, at 42-43.
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by clarifying that the rule does not intend "to grant a right of nonfinal review
if the lower tribunal denies a motion for summary judgment based on the
existence of a material fact dispute. 35
Added to the list of reviewable non-final orders were those that
determine "that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to absolute or
qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law."36 This
addition was in response to the decision in Tucker v. Resha,37 which asked
that the Appellate Court Rules Committee submit a proposed amendment to
allow for review of orders of this nature.38
A new subdivision was also added to the rule making it clear that
multiple non-final orders within the scope of the rule may be reviewed by a
single notice of appeal if the notice is timely filed as to each such order.3 9
F.

Rule 9.140: Appeal Proceedings in CriminalCases

Several amendments expanded the number of appealable orders. The
rule now allows defendants to appeal from: 1) orders granting or modifying
community control;40 2) unlawful sentences; 4 1 or 3) sentences, if appeals are
permitted by general law42 or "as otherwise provided by general law., 43 In
addition, it now allows the state to appeal from orders: 1) dismissing
affidavits "charging the commission of a criminal offense, the violation of
probation, the violation of community control, or the violation of any
supervised correctional release;" 44 2) granting motions for judgment of
acquittal after jury verdicts; 45 3) finding a defendant incompetent; 46 4)
"imposing an unlawful or illegal sentence or imposing a sentence outside the
range permitted by the sentencing guidelines;" 47 5) "imposing a sentence
outside the range recommended by the sentencing guidelines; '48 or 6)
34. 668 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
35. 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. App. P. 9.130.
36. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 (a)(3)(C)(viii).
37. 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1994). For a discussion of the decision in Tucker, see 1995
Survey, supra note 1, at 10-11.
38. Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1190.
39. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(h).
40. Id. 9.140(b)(1)(B) and (C).
41. Id. 9.140(b)(1)(D).
42. Id. 9.140(b)(1)(E).
43. Id. 9.140(b)(1)(F).
44. FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A).
45. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(E).
46. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(H).
47. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(J).
48. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(K).
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"denying restitution;" 49 or "as otherwise provided by general law for final
orders."
The amendments also indicate that "[tihe state as provided by
general law may appeal to the circuit court non-final orders rendered in the
county court. '' r
1
A new subdivision was added to the rule to accurately reflect the
limited right of direct appeal after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 5 3 It
states that "[a] defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may
expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower
tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved. 54
The new subdivision goes on to state:
(B) A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may
otherwise directly appeal only
(i) the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
(ii) a violation of the plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to
withdraw plea;
(iii) an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw
plea;
(iv) a sentencing error, if preserved; or
55
(v) as otherwise provided by law.
Except for those appeals in which a defendant expressly reserves the right to
appeal a dispositive order, the record for appeals involving a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere shall be limited to:
a. all indictments, informations, affidavits of violation of probation
or community control and other charging documents;
b. the plea and sentencing hearing transcripts;
c. any written plea agreements;

49. FLA. R APP. P. 9.140(c)(1)(L).
50. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(M).

51. Id. 9.140(c)(2).
52. Id 9.140(b)(2).

53. See 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140.
54. FLA. R APP. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A).

55. Id. 9.140(b)(2)(B)(i)-(v).
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d. any judgments, sentences, scoresheets, motions and orders to
correct or modify sentences, orders imposing, modifying, or
revoking probation or community control, orders assessing costs,
fees, fines, or restitution against the defendant, and any other
documents relating to sentencing;
e. any motion to withdraw plea and order thereon;
f. notice of appeal, statement of judicial acts to be reviewed,
56
directions to the clerk, and designation to the court reporter.
In addition, "[u]pon good cause shown, the court, or the lower tribunal
before the record is transmitted, may expand the record.""
The rule was also clarified to indicate that a defendant may institute an
appeal by filing a notice of appeal "at any time between rendition of a final
judgment and 30 days following rendition of a written order imposing
sentence. 58
Pursuant to the dictates of Lopez v. State,59 the rule now also provides
that when the state appeals an order, a defendant may cross appeal on related
issues involved in the same order bZ serving a notice within ten days of
service of the state's notice of appeal.
Another amendment affects the procedures to be used in death penalty
cases. It provides that in such cases "all petitions for extraordinary relief
over which the supreme court has original jurisdiction, including petitions
for writ of habeas corpus, shall be filed simultaneously with the initial brief
in the appeal from the lower tribunal's order on the defendant's application
for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850."61 It further
indicates that the provision of the rule relating to belated appeals 62 shall not
apply to death penalty cases.

63

A new subdivision 64 dealing with sentencing errors provides that claims
of such errors "may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first
been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. 9.140(b)(2)(C)(i)(a)-(f).
Id. 9.140(b)(2)(C)(ii).
Id. 9.140(b)(3).
638 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1994).
FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(4).
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(b)(6)(E).
Id. 9.1400).
Id. 9.140(b)(6)(E).
Id. 9.140(d).
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sentencing;
or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(b)."'
The portion of the rule relating to transcripts was amended to allow
nonindigent defendants to order just the original transcripts from the court
reporters and to make copies for all parties. 66 Parties electing to use the
procedure must serve notice of its use on counsel for the state, file the
original transcripts and copies for the state and each defendant with the clerk
of the lower tribunal for inclusion in the record, and attach a certificate to
each copy certifying that it is an accurate and complete copy of the original
transcript.67 When this procedure is used, the clerk of the lower tribunal
shall be required to "retain the original transcript[s] for use as needed by the
state in any collateral proceedings and shall not destroy the transcripts
68 The procedures can
without the consent" of the Attorney General's
69 office.
appeals.
it
when
state
the
by
utilized
also be
The adoption of this amendment is intended to supersede the dictates of
Brown v. State,70 and allow the use by nonindigent defendants and the state
of a procedure previously available only in civil cases pursuant to rule
71
9.200(b)(2) of the FloridaRules ofAppellate Procedure.
In cases in which the defendant is indigent, or in which the party taking
the appeal elects not to use the above discussed procedure, "the parties shall
designate the court reporter to file with the clerk of the lower tribunal the
original transcripts for the court and sufficient copies for the state and all
indigent defendants."72 The lower tribunal may, however, in publically
funded cases, direct its clerk, rather than the
73 court reporter, to prepare the
necessary copies of the original transcripts.
Regardless of the method of transcript preparation, the clerk of the
lower tribunal shall within fifty days of the filing of the notice of appeal,7 4
prepare and serve copies of the record to the court, counsel for the state, and
all counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants on appeal. 75 The clerk
"shall simultaneously serve copies of the index to all nonindigent defendants

65. Id. 9.140(d)(2).
66. FLA. R.App. P. 9.140(e)(2)(D).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. 9.140(e)(2)(E).
70. 639 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). For a discussion of the decision in
Brown, see 1995 Survey, supra note 1, at 51-52.
71. Brown, 639 So. 2d at 635.
72. FLA.R. APP. P. 9.140(e)(2)(C).
73. Id9.140(e)(2)(F).
74. Id 9.140(e)(1).
75. Id. 9.140(e)(4).
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and, upon their request, copies of the record or portions thereof at the cost
prescribed by law."
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the clerk of the lower tribunal
shall retain all original documents except the original transcripts designated
for appeal which shall be included in the record transmitted to the [appellate]
77
court.,
"Except in death penalty cases, the [appellate] court shall return
the record to the lower tribunal after final disposition of the appeal. 7 8
The appellant's initial brief "shall be served within 30 days of 79service
later.,
of the record or designation of appointed counsel, whichever is
The time period for filing any appellant's brief in appeals from orders
denying relief under rules 3.800(a) or 3.850 of the FloridaRules of Criminal
Procedure was limited to within fifteen days of the filing of the notice of
appeal .80
Another new subdivision of the rule establishes the procedure for
petitions seeking belated appeals or alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. 81 The procedure calls for both of these types of claims to be
82
presented directly to the appellate courts. Previously, the dictates of State
v. District Court of Appeal of Florida,FirstDistrict,83 mandated that a claim
that an appeal was frustrated by ineffective assistance of trial counsel (most
frequently, the failure to file a notice of appeal) must be raised by a motion
in the trial court pursuant to rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure,and that a claim of ineffective appellate counsel was to be raised
in a habeas corpus petition filed in the appellate court. 84 The second district,
in Stephenson v. State, 8' had expressed frustration with its inability to grant
relief when trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of
appeal. 86 On review of the 'district court's decision in Stephenson, the
87
Supreme Court of Florida continued to require the then-existing procedure,
but gave some indication of a willingness to eventually change the process,
noting that it was adhering to the principle established in District Court of

76. Id.
77. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(e)(3).
78. Id. 9.140(e)(5).
79. Id. 9.140(f).
80. Id. 9.140(i).
81. Id. 9.140().
82. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.1400)(1).
83. 569 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1990).
84. Id. at 441-42.
85. 640 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
86. Id. at 119.
87. Stephenson v. State, 655 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 1995).
Stephenson opinions, see 1995 Survey, supra note 1, at 52-53.
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Appeal "for now" and that the issue was at that time
88 under review by both
the court and the Appellate Court Rules Committee.
The new subdivision requires both petitions for belated appeals and
petitions "alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel [to] be filed 89in
the appellate court to which the appeal was or should have been taken."
Such petitions are to be in the form prescribed by the rule dealing with
original proceedings in the appellate courts9" and shall recite in the statement
of facts:
(A) the date and nature of the lower tribunal's order sought to be
reviewed;
(B) the name of the lower tribunal rendering the order;
(C) the nature, disposition, and dates of all previous proceedings
in the lower tribunal and, if any, in the appellate courts;
(D) if a previous petition was filed, the reason the claim in the
present petition was not raised previously;
(E)the nature of the relief sought; and
(F) the specific facts sworn to by the petitioner or petitioner's
counsel that constitute the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
or basis for entitlement to belated appeal, including in the case of a
petition for belated appeal whether
the petitioner requested counsel
91
to proceed with the appeal.
The petitioner is required to serve copies of the petition on both the attorney
general and the state attorney. 92 "The [appellate] court may by order identify
any provision of this rule that the petition fails to satisfy and, pursuant to
rule 9.040(d), allow the petitioner a specified time to serve an amended
petition."'93 The appellate court may also "dismiss a second or successive
petition if it does not allege new grounds and the prior determination was on
94
the merits, or if a failure to assert the grounds was an abuse of procedure."

88. Stephenson, 655 So. 2d at 87 n.1.
89. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.1400)(1).

90. Id. 9.100.
91. Id.
9.140j)(2)(A)-(F).
92. Id.9.1400)(4).

93. Id.
9.1400)(5)(B).
94. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.1400)(5)(C).
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The appellate rule relating to original proceedings 95 shall govern the
processing of the petition.96 "An order granting a petition for belated appeal
shall be filed with the lower tribunal and treated as the notice of appeal, if no
previous notice of appeal has been filed." 97
The 98new subdivision also establishes time limits for the filing of
petitions:

(A) A petition for belated appeal shall not be filed more than two
years after the expiration of time for filing the notice of appeal
from a final order, unless it alleges under oath with a specific
factual basis that the petitioner
(i) was unaware an appeal had not been timely filed or was not
advised of the right to an appeal; and
(ii) should not have ascertained such facts by the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
(B) A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
shall not be filed more than two years after the conviction becomes
final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific
factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the
results of the appeal by counsel.
(C) Time periods under this subdivision shall not begin
to run
100
prior to the effective date [January 1, 199799] of this rule.
G.

Rule 9.145: Appeal Proceedings in Juvenile Delinquency Cases

This new rule provides that appeal proceedings in juvenile delinquency
cases shall be as in criminal cases, except as modified by this rule. 011 It
states:

95. Id. 9.100.
96. Id. 9.140(j)(5)(A).
97. Id. 9.140(j)(5)(D).
98. Id. 9.140(j)(3).
99. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103, 1107
(Fla. 1996).
100. FLA. R. App. P. 9.1400)(3).
101. Id. 9.145(a).
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(b) Appeals by Child. To the extent adversely affected, a child or
any parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a child may appeal
(1) an order of adjudication of delinquency or withholding
adjudication of delinquency, or any disposition order entered
thereon;
(2) orders entered after adjudication or withholding of
adjudication of delinquency, including orders revoking or
modifying the community control;
(3) an illegal disposition; or
102
(4) any other final order as provided by law.
It further indicates the state may appeal an order:
(A) dismissing a petition for delinquency or any part of it, if the
order is entered before the commencement of an adjudicatory
hearing;
(B) suppressing confessions, admissions, or evidence obtained by
search and/or seizure before the adjudicatory hearing;
(C) granting a new adjudicatory hearing;
(D) arresting judgment;

(E) discharging a child under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure
8.090;
(F) ruling on a question of law if a child appeals an order of
disposition;
(G) constituting an illegal disposition;
(H) discharging a child on habeas corpus; or
(I) finding a child 0incompetent
pursuant to the Florida Rules of
3
Juvenile Procedure.1

102. Id.
9.145(b)(l)-(4).
103. Id. 9.145(e)(1)(A)-(I).
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Under the rule,
[i]f the state appeals a pre-adjudicatory hearing order of the trial
court, the notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days and before
commencement of the adjudicatory hearing.
(A) A child in detention whose case is stayed pending state appeal
shall be released from detention pending the appeal if the child is
charged with an offense that would be bailable if the child were
charged as an adult, unless the lower tribunal for good cause stated
in an order determines otherwise. The lower tribunal retains
discretion to release from detention any child who is not otherwise
entitled to release under the provisions of this rule.
(B) If a child has been found incompetent to proceed, any order
staying the proceedings on a state appeal shall10 4have no effect on
any order entered for the purpose of treatment.
Appeals in juvenile delinquency cases "shall be entitled and docketed with
the initials, but not the name, of the child and the court case number. All
references to the child in briefs, other papers, and the decision of the court
shall be by initials."105 The rule does not require the deletion of the name of
the child from pleadings or other papers transmitted to the court from the
lower tribunal.
All papers in juvenile delinquency appeals "shall remain sealed in the
office of the clerk of court when not in use by the court, and shall not be
except by the parties and their counsel, or as otherwise
open to inspection
0
ordered."
H. Rule 9.146: Appeal Proceedingin Juvenile Dependency and
Termination ofParentalRights Cases and Cases Involving Families
and Children in Need of Services
This new rule provides that "[a]ppeal proceedings in juvenile
dependency and termination of parental rights cases and cases involving
families and children in need of services shall be as in civil cases except as

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. 9.145(c)(2).
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.145(d).
See 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. App. P. 9.145.
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.145(e).
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modified by this rule." 10 8 It permits "[a]ny child, any parent, guardian ad
litem, or legal custodian of any child, any other party to the proceeding
affected by an order of the lower tribunal, or the appropriate state agency as
provided by law" to appeal to the appropriate
10 9 court within the time and in
the manner prescribed by the appellate rules.
"The taking of an appeal shall not operate as a stay in any case unless
pursuant to an order of the court. '10 With two exceptions, a party seeking to
stay an "order pending review shall file a motion in the lower tribunal, which
shall have continuing jurisdiction, in its discretion, to grant, modify, or deny
such relief, after considering the welfare and best interest of the child."
The two exceptions are as provided by general law 112 and that a termination
of parental rights order with placement of the child with a licensed childplacing agency or the Department of Children and Family Services for
subsequent adoption shall be suspended while the appeal is pending, but 1the
13
child shall continue in custody under the order until the appeal is decided.
Transmittal of the record in cases governed by the rule will not remove
the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal to conduct judicial reviews or other
proceedings related to the health and welfare of the child pending
appeal.... When the parent or child is a party to the appeal, the appeal shall
be docketed and any papers filed in the court shall be entitled with the
initials, but not the name, of the child or parent and the court case number.
in briefs, other papers, and the decision
All references to the child or parent
114
of the court shall be by initials.
The rule "does not require deletion of the names of the child and
parents from pleadings
and other papers transmitted to the court from the
'1 15
lower tribunal."
All papers in cases governed by the rule "shall remain sealed in the
office of the clerk of the court when not in use by the court, and shall not be
open to inspection except by the parties and their counsel, or as otherwise
ordered.,,116The appellate court is required to give priority to appeals under this
117
rule.

108. Id 9.146(a).
109. Id.9.146(b).
110. Id. 9.146(c)(2).
111. Id. 9.146(c)(1).
112. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.146(c)(1).
113. Id. 9.146(c)(2).
114. Id. 9.146(d)-(e).
115. 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.146.
116. FLA. R. AlP. P. 9.146(f).
117. Id. 9.146(g).
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Rule 9.180: Appeal Proceedingsto Review Workers' Compensation
Cases

I

This new rule consolidates and moves into the appellate rules the
procedures previously set forth in Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation
Procedure 4.160, 4.161, 4.165, 4.166, 4.170, 4.180, 4.190, 4.220, 4.225,
4.230, 4.240, 4.250, 4.260, 4.265, 4.270, and 4.280.'18 The change was
and not to change the general nature
intended to eliminate duplicative rules
19
of workers' compensation appeals."
.

Rule 9.200: The Record

A new subdivision was added to the rule to provide that in family law
cases "the clerk of the lower tribunal shall retain the original orders, reports
and recommendations of masters or hearing officers, and judgments within
the file of the lower tribunal and shall include copies thereof within the
record.'120 This subdivision "was added because family law cases frequently
have continuing activity at the lower tribunal level during the pendency of
appellate proceedings and that continued activity may be hampered by the
absence of orders being enforced during the pendency of the appeal.
The wording of the rule was also changed to require that "[t]he
transcript of the trial shall be securely bound in consecutively numbered
volumes not to exceed 200 pages each, and each page shall be numbered
consecutively."' 122 Prior to the amendment, the rule referred to the
"transcript of proceedings." 123 The purpose of the change was "to be
consistent with and to clarify the requirement in subdivision (d)(1)(B) that it
is only the transcript of trial that is not to be renumbered by the clerk."' 124
Under the amended rule, "it remains the duty of the clerk to consecutively
number transcripts other than the transcript of the trial.' 125 The Appellate
Court Rules Committee indicated its view that "if the consecutive pagination
hardship for the court reporting
requirement is impracticable or becomes a 126
entity, relief may be sought from the court."'

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.180.
Id.
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200(a)(2).
1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200.
FLA. R. App. P. 9.200(b)(2).
1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Rule 9.210: Briefs

The rule, which had required briefs to be bound in book form and
fastened along the left side, 12rwas amended to state that briefs "should" be
bound and fastened as previously required and added the words "in a manner
that will allow them to lie flat when opened. 128 The amended rule also
provides that "[a]ltematively, briefs may be securely stapled in the upper left
corner" and that no method
2 9 of securing the brief other than the two set forth
in the rule is acceptable.
The rule was also amended to require references to the appropriate
volume, as well as the appropriate page number of the record on appeal, in
the statement of the case and of the facts. 3 °
Another change to the rule eliminates the requirement that in answer
briefs, the statement of the case and of the facts shall be omitted unless there
are areas of disagreement, which should be clearly specified.1' The new
version of the rule simply states that "the statement of the case and of the
facts may be omitted.' 2 The purpose of the change is "to permit appellees
to file their own statements of case and facts."'3 3 In amending the rule, the
court recognized "that there are some instances in which it is difficult, if not
impossible, for the appellee to intelligibly specify the area of disagreement
in the statement of the case and facts of the appellants,"' 1 4 but encouraged
"appellees not to rewrite the statement... except where clearly
135
necessary.',
The portion of the rule dealing with notices of supplemental authority
was transferred
to the new rule 9.225 of the Florida Rules of Appellate
36
Procedure.

127. FLA. R. App.P. 9.210(a)(3) (amended 1996).
128. Id.
129. Id.

130. Id. 9.210(b)(3).
131. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(c).
132. Id.
133. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103, 1106
(Fla. 1996).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See 1996 Committee Notes to FLA.R. Ap. P. 9.210.
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Rule 9.225: Notice of SupplementalAuthority

This new rule is an amended version of the former rule 9.210(g) of the
FloridaRules of Appellate Procedure.37 It adds language138that requires that
supplemental authorities be significant to the issues raised.
M

Rule 9.300: Motions

This rule was amended to add "[m]otions relating to expediting the
appeal" to the list of motions
that do not toll the time schedule of
1 39
proceedings in appellate courts.
N. Rule 9.310: Stay Pending Review
This rule was amended to eliminate former subdivision (b)(3), which
provided that the timely filing of a notice of appeal automatically operated as
a stay pending review of an award by a judge of compensation claims on a
claim for birth related neurological injuries.
0.

Rule 9.315: Summary Disposition

The references in the rule to "expedited" disposition, affirmance, and
141
reversal were changed to "summary" disposition, affirmance, and reversal.
P.

Rule 9.400: Costs andAttorneys'Fees

An amendment clarified the fact that only orders rendered "by the
42 lower
tribunal" are subject to review by the appellate court under this rule.1
Q.

Rule 9.420: Filing; Service of Copies; Computation of Time

This rule was amended to require that certificates
of service must
43
specify the party each attorney being served represents.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
FLA. R. App. P. 9.225.

Id. 9.300(d)(9).
Id. 9.3 10 (amended 1996).
Id. 9.315.
Id. 9.400(c).
FLA. R. App. P. 9.420(c)(2).
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Rule 9.430: Proceedingsby Indigents

Added to this rule was a new paragraph that provides that "[a]n
appellate court may, in its discretion, presume that an incarcerated party who
has been declared indigent for purposes of proceedings in the144lower tribunal
remains indigent, in the absence of evidence to the contrary."
The language replaced an emergency amendment that the court had
adopted in McFadden v. Fourth District Court of Appeal145 in response to
concerns expressed by the fourth district in McFadden v. West Palm Beach
Police Officer 146 regarding the need for an amendment to the rules that
would allow determination of indigency for appellate purposes to be made at
the appellate level. 47 The emergency amendment, which had called for an
indigent incarcerated party to file a motion and affidavit with the appellate
court and which allowed the court to either determine the issue or remand to
the lower tribunal for determination when an objection is filed, 148 had been
retroactively stayed due to concerns that it could create procedural
problems. 149 The new language submitted by the Appellate Court Rules
Committee was agreed upon by representatives of each of the district courts
of appeal15 0 and, in the view of the supreme court, apears to give "each
court the flexibility necessary to handle these matters."'
S.

Rule 9.600: Jurisdictionof Lower TribunalPendingReview

The portion of this rule relating to family law matters was amended to
state that "[t]he receipt, payment, or transfer of funds or property... shall
not prejudice the rights of appeal of any party.' 52 Added was a new
sentence which provides that "[t]he lower tribunal shall have the jurisdiction
to impose, modify, or dissolve conditions upon the receipt or payment of
such awards in order to protect the interests of the parties during the
appeal.' 53 Additionally, "[r]eview of orders entered pursuant to this
144. Id. 9.430.
145. 682 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 1996).
146. 658 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). For a discussion of both opinions
in McFadden,see 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 16.
147. West Palm Beach Police Officer, 658 So. 2d at 1048.
148. FourthDist. Court ofAppeal, 682 So. 2d at 1069.

149. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103, 1106
(Fla. 1996).
150. Id.
151. Id
152. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.600(c)(2).
153. Id.
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subdivision154shall be by motion filed in the appellate court within 30 days of
rendition."
A new subdivision of the rule 155 recognizes that while an appeal is
pending, trial courts have the jurisdiction to rule on motions for posttrial
release and motions pursuant to rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of
CriminalProcedure.'5 The new subdivision requires that within ten days of
any order granting relief under the criminal
rule, the movant must file a copy
1 57
of the order with the appellate court.
T.

Rule 9.700: Guide to Times andActs under Rules
This rule was eliminated.

U.

Rule 9.800: Uniform CitationSystem

Examples of citations were adopted for the FloridaRules for Certified
and Court-Appointed Mediators, the Florida Rules for Court-Appointed
Arbitrators, and the FloridaFamily Law Rules of Procedure. They are as
follows:
Fla. R. Med. 10.010;
Fla. R. Arb. 11.010;
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.01 0

58

The court eliminated the requirement that initial references to the
United States Supreme Court should cite to the United States Reports,
Supreme Court Reporter, and Lawyer's Edition and that subsequent
citations, as well as pinpoint citations, shall be to the United States Reports
only. Substituted was the following language: "Cite to United States
Reports, if published therein; otherwise cite to Supreme Court Reporter,
Lawyer's Edition,
or United States Law Week, in that order of
159
preference."'

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. 9.600(c)(3).
Id. 9.600(d).
1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.600.
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.600(d).
Id. 9.800(i).
Id. 9.800(k).
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III. OTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE

The Supreme Court of Florida adopted,
to the appellate rules necessary to facilitate
to the new Administrative Procedure Act,
which took effect on October 1, 1996. 16
"administrative action" to include:

on an emergency basis, changes
administrative appeals pursuant
chapter 120, Florida Statutes,
The court redefined the term

(1) final agency action as defined in the Administrative Procedure
Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes;
(2) non-final action by an agency or administrative law judge
reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act;
(3) quasi-judicial decisions by any administrative body, agency,
board or commission not subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act; and
(4) administrative action for which judicial review is provided by
general law. 161
The court also adopted a new rule162 relating to judicial review of
administrative action; except as specifically modified by the rule such
review shall be governed by the general rules of appellate procedure. 1?3 The
rule further states that an appeal from a final agency action or other
administrative action for which judicial review is provided by law shall be
commenced in accordance with rule 9.110(c), the rule governing review of
final orders of administrative tribunals. 164 On the other hand, unless judicial
review by appeal is provided by general law, review of a non-final action is
commenced by the filing of a petition for review in accordance with rules
9.100(b) and (c), 165 which deal with the commencement of original
proceedings in appellate courts. 166 Similarly, unless judicial review by
appeal is provided by general law, review of a quasi-judicial decision is also

160. Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(a) & Adoption of
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.190, 681 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1996).

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(a)(1)-(4).
Id 9.190.
Id 9.190(a).
Id. 9.190(b)(1).
Id. 9.190(b)(2).
FLA. R. App. P. 9.190(b)(2).
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to be commenced by the
67 filing of a petition for certiorari in accordance with
rule 9.100 (b) and (C).1
The rule also sets forth the materials to be included in the record in
cases in which judicial review of administrative action is sought. 168 The
requirements of the rule are quite extensive, s ecific, and vary significantly
depending on the type of order under review.
Regardless of the nature of
the order, however, the rule provides that when "hearing testimony is
preserved through the use of videotape rather than through an official
transcript, the testimony from the videotape shall be transcribed and the
transcript shall be made a part of the record before the record is transmitted
to the court., 170 The rule also provides that "[t]he contents of the record may
be modified as provided in rule 9.200(a)(2),"''
which at the time of
adoption of Rule 9.190, allowed an appellent to direct the clerk to include or
exclude other documents and required a statement of judicial acts to be
reviewed if the clerk was being directed to transmit
less than the entire
1 72
record or less than all testimony in a proceeding.
The rule also addresses attorneys' fees, stating that a motion for such
fees may be served not later than the time for service of the reply brief and
shall state the grounds on which the recovery is sought, citing all pertinent
statutes. The assessment of attorneys' fees may be remanded to the 73
lower
tribunal or the administrative law judge or referred to a special master.1
Review of attorneys' fees orders rendered under rule 9.190(d)(2) shall
be by motion filed in the court within thirty days of the order's
rendition.1 74 "Review of objections to reports of special masters
shall be on
75
motion filed in the court within 30 days of the report's filing."'
IV. COURT DIVISIONS

In an administrative order, 176 the first district, the only Florida district
court that has divided itself into divisions, 7 7 merged its Criminal Division

167. Id. 9.190(b)(3).
168. Id. 9.190(c).
169. Compare id. 9.190(c)(2)(A)-(E), (c)(3) and (c)(4).
170. Id. 9.190(c)(5).
171. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.190(c)(6).
172. Id. 9.200(a)(3). As part of the subsequent four-year cycle amendments to the
appellate rules, rule 9.200(a)(2) was renumbered as (a)(3).
173. Id. 9.190(d)(1).
174. Id. 9.190(d)(2).
175. Id.
176. Fla. Admin. Order No. 97-1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. May 20, 1997).
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into its General Division effective January 1, 1998. After the effective date,
the court will sit in two divisions called the General Division and the
Administrative Division.
V. JURISDICTION

The fourth district, in Caruso v. Terry's Foods, Inc.,178 transferred to
the first district, a case which sought review by certiorari of an order entered
by ajudge of compensation claims.179 The court noted that although the first
district has exclusive jurisdiction over workers' compensation appeals, there
exists no specific provision relating to jurisdiction over extraordinary writs
in such cases.180 In determining that the case should be transferred, the court
relied on cases 181 expressing the principle that extraordinary writs can only
be issued by courts
with appellate jurisdiction over the tribunal whose order
182
is challenged.
VI. APPEALS TO CIRCUIT COURTS

In Montero v. Oak Casualty Insurance Co., 8 3 a direct appeal to the
circuit court in Dade County was dismissed by an order entered by one
judge.1 4 Reviewing the order of dismissal on a petition for certiorari, the
third district noted that the Supreme Court of Florida rule establishing the
appellate division of the Dade County Circuit Court provides for cases to be
heard on their merits by three-judge panels.185 Although the rule also
permits "matters preliminary to final determination" to be decided based on
subsequent rules, the court noted that it appears no subsequent rules have
ever been adopted. 186 The court found in any event that, "[o]rders
177. In In re Court Divisions, the court was split into a "General Division" and an
"Administrative Division." In re Court Divisions, 648 So. 2d 761, 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994). In a subsequent administrative order, the Criminal Division was created. Fla. Admin.
Order No. 95-2 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1996).
178. 683 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
179. Id. at 1136.
180. Id.
181. State ex rel. Bettendorf v. Martin County Envtl. Control Hearing Bd., 564 So. 2d
1227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Nellen v. State, 226 So. 2d 354 (Fla.1st Dist. Ct. App.

1969).
182. Caruso, 683 So. 2d at 1136-37 (citing State ex rel. Bettendorf v. Martin County
Environmental Control Hearing Bd., 564 So. 2d 1227 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
183. 693 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
184. Id. at 1024.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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dismissing appeals are of lasting import[,]" and that they are "not merely
'preliminary to final determination,"' but are "the end of the road" for
appeals.1 7 The court, therefore, granted certiorari concluding that any order
be entered by the
of the appellate division which dismisses an appeal 1"must
88
majority of a three-judge panel assigned to the case."
VII. ORDERS REVIEWABLE

As usual, a large number of cases dealt with the question of whether
certain orders were reviewable, either by appeal or by certiorari. The sheer
volume of these cases precludes discussion of the reasoning relied on in each
case. Therefore, this article will set forth some of the cases indicating the
type of order involved and the conclusion reached. 89
A.

OrdersReviewable by Appeal

Among the orders found to be reviewable by appeal were: 1) an order
denying a motion to dismiss and compelling arbitration under a
homeowner's insurance policy, in a case in which the appellate court
determined that an appraisal provision in the policy constituted an agreement
to arbitrate; 190 2) an order denying a motion to dismiss that rejected a
defense of qualified immunity, as a matter of law; 191 3) an order on a motion
for permanent injunction, which allowed an election to proceed with a
disputed question on the ballot and that reserved ruling on the legality of the
ballot question; 192 4) an order compelling a law firm to disburse funds
partially to the guardian ad litem of a minor with the residue to be paid to a
particular attorney; 193 5) an order denying a motion by a personal
representative to strike and dismiss a decedent's brother's petition to revoke

187. Id.
188. Montero, 693 So. 2d at 1024.
189. This section of the article will deal only with civil cases. Criminal cases will be
discussed in section XXIV(a).
190. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sheaffer, 687 So. 2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
191. Junior v. Reed, 693 So. 2d 586, 588-89 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
192. Miami Heat Ltd. Partnership v. Leahy, 682 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
193. Garel and Jacobs, P.A. v. Wick, 683 So. 2d 184, 185-87 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
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probate; 194 and 6) an order expressly granting recognition of a foreign
judgment. 95
B.

OrdersNot Reviewable by Appeal

Among the orders found nonreviewable by appeal were: 1) an order
setting an evidentiary hearing in a dissolution case on the propriety of a
wife's relocation out of state;" 96 2) an order denying a motion seeking relief
from an order denying without prejudice a motion for final judgment; 197 3)
an order denying a motion for summary judgment in an action against an
insurance company for failure to defend claims and stating that the "duty to
defend may well have been triggered" by certain allegations; 19 4) an order
granting a creditor's motion to extend the time for filing a statement of claim
in an estate; 199 and 5) an order requiring a plaintiff to have no contact with
the defendants, except through counsel, nor to go within a certain distance of
a law firm representing the defendant in one case,
and that was itself a
2
defendant in a second case brought by the plaintiff. 00
C.

OrdersReviewable by Certiorari

Among the orders found reviewable by certiorari were: 1) an order
revoking a clerk of the court's reassignment of the trial court clerks and
making assignments of the trial court clerks to a circuit judge; 20 1 2) an order
disqualifying counsel; 202 3) an order sustaining an objection to a request for
admission, as to the amount in controversy, when the requested admission
involved the defendant's right to remove the case to federal court; 20 3 4) an
order requiring a wife to undergo a psychological evaluation; 20 4 5) an order
denying an objection to accounting and a motion to extend the time for filing

194. In re Estate of Pavlick, 697 So. 2d 157, 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
195. Chabert v. Bacqui6, 694 So. 2d 805, 808 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
196. Shaw v. Shaw, 696 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
197. Bell v. Broward County Personnel Review Bd., 691 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
198. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bethune-Cookman College, Inc., 687 So. 2d 991, 992
(Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997).
199. In re Estate ofLejkowitz, 679 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
200. Lamothe v. Sellars, 695 So. 2d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
201. Morse v. Moxley, 691 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
202. Laino v. Laino, 686 So. 2d 786, 786 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
203. Sunrise Mills (MLP) Ltd. Partnership v. Adams, 688 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
204. Vo v. Bui, 680 So. 2d 601, 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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further objections when an allegation was made that the trial court's decision
was based on improper ex parte communication; 2°5 6) an order dismissing
numerous defendants due to a conclusion that they were improperly
joined; 2 0 6 7) an order denying a motion to strike a lis pendens;20 7 8) an order
denying dismissal of a complaint in a medical malpractice action alleging
that the plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory pre-suit screening and
corroboration requirements; 2 0 8 9) an order awarding costs and attorneys' fees
after a voluntary dismissal;2 0 9 and 10) an order returning a child to the
custody of her mother in a dependency proceeding.1 0
D.

OrdersNot Reviewable by Certiorari

Among the orders found non-reviewable by certiorari were: 1) an order
denying a motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel; 211 2)
an order denying a motion to compel a defendant to produce a photograph of
an accident scene; 212 3) an order granting a motion to strike from a wife's
witness list, two lawyers in her husband's law firm; 213 4) an order denying a
motion for summary judgment based on the contention that certain claims
were preempted by federal law;2 14 and 5) an order15 imposing the sanction of
attorneys' fees and costs for discovery violations.2

205. Wilson v. Armstrong, 686 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
206. Intercapital Funding Corp. v. Gisclair, 683 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
207. Archer v. Archer, 692 So. 2d 1009, 1009 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
208. Citron v. Shell, 689 So. 2d 1288, 1292-93 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
209. Sholkoffv. Boca Raton Community Hosp., Inc., 693 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
210. In re Interest of K.D., 679 So. 2d 39, 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
211. South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Dupont, 683 So. 2d 1135, 1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
212. Calfin v. Mclnnis, 683 So. 2d 1137, 1137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
213. Young v. Young, 682 So. 2d 678, 678 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
214. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 680 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1996).
215. Leonhardt v. Masters, 679 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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VIII. NOTICES OF APPEAL
A.

Designationof Order to be Reviewed

In Duran v. John Stalder, Inc.,216 the court reviewed, by certiorari, a
decision of a circuit court which, acting in its appellate capacity, decided a
case in favor of an appellee because an appellant's notice of appeal
designated the wrong order to be reviewed.217 The fifth district indicated
that the notice of appeal was timely filed with regard to the reviewable
order.218 The district court indicated that it was clear from the initial brief
what order was being appealed from, and that the circuit court's order did
not even discuss whether the appellee had been prejudiced by the defective
notice. 2 19 "In the absence of serious prejudice," and in light of the fact that
"the defective notice of appeal did not affect the circuit court's jurisdiction,"
the court concluded that the case "should have been disposed of on the
merits" and therefore granted certiorari. 220
B.

Timeliness

In Broward County v. Bell,221 the fourth district granted certiorari to
quash a circuit court order that dismissed, as untimely, a petition filed in that
court challenging an order of the county's personnel board. 222 The record
reflected that the petition had been filed in the clerk's office on the last
allowable date. However, the clerk's computer recorded it as having been
filed the following day because it was filed between four o'clock, "the time
at which filing is clocked in as of the next business day, but before five
o'clock, when the office closes for the day. 223
In Tanner v. State,224 an appeal was reinstated, after the case's
dismissal, because of an apparently untimely notice of appeal. 225 The
appellant's counsel demonstrated that a timely, authorized motion for
rehearing of the order under review was filed, but was returned by the clerk

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

686 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id. at 629.
Id at 628-29.
681 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 918.
Id.
22 Fla. L. Weekly D1471 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. June 18, 1997).
Id. atD1471.
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because it had the wrong case number.226 The fourth district concluded that
such an error "is no basis for refusing to accept the paper for filing 227 nor
228
does it "authorize the clerk to return the paper to the lawyer who filed it.",
Thus, the court held that the motion was deemed filed as of the date it was
originally received. 229 Therefore, the motion served to delay rendition of the
order to be reviewed, making the appeal timely.21 The court suggested that
in such situations, "[a] simple telephone call [from the clerk] to the filing
lawyer could sort out any discrepancies in file numbers, or other errors in the
,, 31
caption
0 that inhibit the clerk's ability to file the paper in the proper
place.
IX. SUPERSEDEAS BOND

In Shvarts v. O'Connor,232 the appellees instituted an independent
appeal from an order determining the amount of a supersedeas bond rather
than seeking review, by motion, under rule 9.310(f) of the FloridaRules of
Appellate Procedure.2
The appellate court consolidated the two cases,
affirmed the underlying appeal, and therefore, found the appeal challenging
the bond to be moot.23 The court noted that if review of the order setting
the bond had been sought by motion, the matter would have been disposed of
months earlier. 235 By taking a separate appeal, however, the matter
"followed the lengthy course of all full appeals."
X. MOTIONS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME

In Merritt v. Promo Graphics, Inc.,237 the appellant's counsel filed a
motion for extension of time which failed to contain a certificate indicating
counsel had consulted with opposing counsel as required by rule 9.300(a) of
the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.38 The denial of this motion
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id. at D1472.
Id.
Tanner, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D 1471.
Id.
Id. atD1472.
692 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 960.
Id.
Id.
Id.
679 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 1277.
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because of this failure, triggered a series of pleadings setting forth
conflicting versions of the facts relating to what efforts were made to comply
with the rule, some of which involved contact between secretaries or other
support personnel. Stating that it relies on "representations made to us by
lawyers, not their support staff,"239 the court discussed the rule's
requirement:
An allegation that a lawyer has complied with rule 9.300 by relying
on a staff person's statement that he or she spoke to another
lawyer's secretary is simply not adequate to comply with the
personal obligation imposed on lawyers by the rules. Rule 9.300
requires some actual contact with opposing counsel. That was
missing here. Apparently, neither the lawyer nor the paralegal
spoke with opposing counsel. We realize that, in a rush, it may be
difficult to contact opposing counsel, or opposing counsel may not
return calls. In such case it would be far better to allege that an
attempt to contact was made, but failed after due diligence.
Further, to avoid this kind of triple-hearsay buck passing between*
staff persons, illustrated by this case, some sort of
acknowledgement of the contact should be made. The modem era
of technology provides creative lawyers with a feast of such
opportunities, including e-mail, voice mail, fax machines, and other
devices. These can be employed to confirm oral communications
and avoid misunderstandings, if written confirmation cannot be
timely obtained. 240
XI. TRANSCRIPTS
a plaintiff claiming on
In Weise v. Repa Film International,Inc.,
appeal that a remark in closing argument by the defendant's counsel
constituted fundamental error did not provide the court with any part of the
Pointing out
transcript, other than the defense counsel's closing argument.
that appellants must demonstrate that errors are not harmless, the court
indicated that when appellants argue that the alleged prejudice from a remark
in closing argument resulted in an adverse verdict, the liability portion of the
transcript will generally be necessary for the court to determine whether a
new trial is warranted. 2 3
239. Id. at 1279.

240. Id.
241. 683 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
242. Id. at 1129.
243. Id.
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2 44
The court, in Estrada v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,
concluded that it was unable to review a claim that a decision was not
supported by competent substantial evidence because of the appellant's
failure to provide a transcript of the hearing conducted by the appeals
referee. 245 The court took this approach despite the fact that after the briefs
in the case were submitted, the appellant filed a motion with the court in
which he requested permission to supplement the record with the
transcript.24 6 The court recognized that rule 9.200(f) of the FloridaRules of
Appellate Procedure states that "' [n]o proceeding shall be determined,
because of an incomplete record, until an opportunity to supplement the
record has been given."' 247 The court declined to apply the rule, however,
because the day after he filed his notice of appeal, the appellant had been
advised by the Unemployment Appeals Commission "that a transcript would
be prepared for him at no cost upon his request and that, if he wished to have
a transcript prepared, it was his responsibility to make the request within ten
days of the appeal." 4 Since the appellant made no such request, the
249 court
concluded that he had waived his opportunity to obtain the transcript.

XII. STATEMENTS OF PROCEEDINGS

No record was made in Warnken v. Warnken250 of a trial court hearing
and thus, the appellant sought to rely on a "state of proceedings" attached to
his brief 25 1 The court noted that although under rule 9.200(b)(4) of the
FloridaRules of Appellate Procedurean appellant can utilize a statement of
proceedings, such a statement must be submitted to and approved by the trial
court .252 Since the appellant in the case failed to comply with that
requirement, the court concluded that it was unable to fully review the
matters about which he complained. 3

244. 693 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
245. Id. at 1092.
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200(f)).
248. Id.
249. Estrada,693 So. 2d at 1092.
250. 689 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
251. Id. at 1123.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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XIII. BRIEFS

A.

PageLimitations

In Johnson v. Singletary,254 a criminal defendant sentenced to death
sought habeas corpus. The defendant's petition alleged, among many other
claims, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
because the Supreme Court of Florida refused to accept his ninety-four page
brief, limiting him to seventy pages instead.255 In denying habeas corpus, the
court noted that the appeal had "occurred before [the court] had adopted a
policy of allowing briefs of up to one hundred pages in capital cases as a
matter of course. An 'exception' to the fifty page-limit prescribed by rule
was, therefore, still an 'exception' to the rule."2 Finding that the twenty
page enlargement that was granted was not inadequate, and pointing to the
fact that the full seventy pages allowed were not used, the court
2 7 found that
no prejudice had occurred and that the issue was without merit. 5
B.

References to Matters Outside the Record

In Ullah v. State,2 58 the appellant's appointed counsel, pursuant to the
dictates of Anders v. California,259 filed a brief indicating that he could
"discern no reversible error in proceedings below."260 In response, the State
filed an answer brief which included a preliminary statement referring to the
case as "another" Anders appeal, listing 112 other pending appeals in which
Anders briefs had been filed during the calendar year, and suggesting "that
these cases should be submitted to an 'Anders panel' for determination of the
common question of whether the appeal is wholly frivolous or requires
adversarial briefing" on the merits. 261

The court struck the State's brief,262 finding that the other pending cases
were matters outside the record and thus, not proper for consideration in the
case under review. 263 The State's suggestion that "all Anders cases present
the common issue of whether the appeal is wholly frivolous," the court said

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

695 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1996).
Id at 264.
Id. at 266.
Id.
679 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Ullah, 679 So. 2d at 1243.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1245.
Id at 1244.
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"ignores the fact that our review in this appeal is limited to the record of
proceedings as they occurred in this case," and "is akin to suggesting that
reference to any other pending appeal in a brief before this court is
necessarily appropriate because all appeals, at their heart, present the
common264question of whether reversible error occurred in the proceedings
below.
XIV. NOTICES OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

On the afternoon prior to oral argument in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Young, '65 the appellee filed a notice of supplemental
authority to which was attached copies of five cases, the most recent of
which was decided in 1989.266 The first district struck the notice, 267 and
stated in its opinion that "the filing of last-minute notices of supplemental
authority is occurring in this court with increasing frequency., 268 The court
published its ruling to quote and reiterate the advice it had set forth in Ogden
Allied Services v. Panesso.269 In that case, the court had indicated that rule
2 7 ° which allowed for
9.2 10(g) of the FloridaRules of Appellate Procedure,
the filing of notices of supplemental authority, was "not intended to permit a
litigant to submit what amounts to an additional brief, under the guise of
'supplemental authorities'; [sic] or to ambush an opponent by deliberately
27
withholding significant case citations until just before oral argument., 1
The quoted portion of Ogden Allied Services indicated that filing such last
minute notices "places the opposing party at a disadvantage," forces that
party to "divert attention from preparation for the argument," and frequently,
requires that party "at oral argument to request an opportunity to respond in
writing" to the notice.272

264. Id.
265. 690 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
266. Id. at 1380.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. (referencing Ogden Allied Servs. v. Panesso, 619 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993)). For a discussion of the decision in Odgen Allied Services, see 1993 Survey,
supra note 1, at 25.
270. The rule referred to in Odgen Allied Services was subsequently renumbered as rule
9.225 of the FloridaRules ofAppellate Procedure. See sections II(K) and (L) of this article.
271. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 690 So. 2d at 1380 (quoting Odgen Allied
Servs. v. Panesso, 619 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
272. Id.
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XV. DISMISSAL
In Leonard v. First Union NationalBank of Florida,273 the third district
reviewed an order of the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, that
had dismissed an appeal because of the late filing of the initial appellate
brief.274 The appellant filed the brief three days after receipt of the denial of
the last of several motions for extension of time.2 " Finding "dismissal to be
the district court
too harsh a sanction for the minimal time involved,"
276
granted certiorari and quashed the dismissal order.
An appeal was taken in Robbie v. Robbie277 from an order requiring the
appellant to pay attorney's fees and costs to his ex-wife's attorney. 278 The
fourth district entered an order requiring the appellant to pay the amounts
due within twenty days and indicated that the failure to do so would result in
the dismissal of the appeal.279 When the appellant did not make payment,
the appeal was dismissed.280

XVI. REINSTATEMENT OF APPEALS
In Fletcher v. State,281 the appeal was dismissed because of the
282
Six months later, the defendant's public
defendant's escape from custody.
defender filed a motion to reinstate the appeal because the defendant had
been returned to custody.283 The second district published its denial of the
motion because of what it termed the "disturbing argument" presented by the
public defender, which suggested that the defendant had "not 'thwarted the
orderly effective administration of justice' because the 'immense apellate
The
backlog' render[ed] his escape a harmless footnote in the process."
court pointed out that "no 'immense appellate backlog"' existed in the court,
but that one "exists and has existed for years in the Office of the Public

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

685 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
683 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Id. (citing Gazil v. Gazil, 343 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 1977)).
696 So. 2d 794 (Fia. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id.
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Defender of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, which is responsible 2for
8 5 handling
appeals for indigent defendants throughout the Second District.
The court noted that "[m]any believe that the legislature's chronic
underfunding of the public defender's office has contributed significantly to
this problem," but indicated that it was "unable to state with certainty,
however, that underfunding is the sole cause leading to the backlog in the
office of the Public Defender of the Tenth Judicial Circuit because that
office appears to be the only appellate public defender in Florida with such a
severe problem. 28 6 The court went on to say that "[r]egardless of the
causes, the public defender's office continues to fail to serve many of its
clients in a timely fashion" and that when the court "relieves that office of its
statutory obligations in many cases," the costs of those appeals are
"frequently shifted to taxpayers in counties who have no right to vote for or
against the person
287 who holds the Office of Public Defender in the Tenth
Judicial Circuit."
Turning to the facts, the court noted that the public defender had spent
time and resources on the case long after the appeal would have been
dismissed had the court known of the defendant's escape.288 Those
resources, the court said, "should have been employed for the benefit of a
prisoner lawfully awaiting the resolution of his or her appeal. 2 89
The court concluded by stating: "Admittedly, the public defender's
office would cease to have a backlog if many of its clients successfully
escaped. This court has been willing to consider a wide array of potential
solutions to the public defender's backlog. Suffice it to say, escape is not
among them."29 °
XVII. MOOTNESS

In Archer v. State,291 an appeal was taken from an order that
involuntarily committed the appellant for a period of no more than six
months.292 Although that period had long elapsed and the appellant might
3
have been released, the first district found that the appeal was not moot.n
Relying on the principle that "an otherwise moot case will not be dismissed
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 795-96.
Fletcher,696 So. 2d at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
681 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 297.
Id.
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if collateral legal consequences that affect the rights of a party flow from the
issue to be determined," the court found that because an order of
commitment may serve as the predicate for continued involuntary placement
orders, it would address the substance of the appeal.294
The third district rejected a mootness claim in Consortion Trading
International,Ltd. v. Lowrance,29 in which the defendants in a foreclosure
action paid the final judgment and satisfied the mortgage. 296 The plaintiff
argued that had "the defendants wanted to preserve their right to appeal, they
should have obtained a stay of execution by posting a supersedeas bond,
instead of paying the final judgment. 297 The court pointed out that '"t]he
majority rule is that if a defendant who has suffered the entry of an adverse
money judgment against him voluntarily pays the judgment, the case is
moot, but ifBayment is involuntary, it does not result in a waiver of the right
Because in the case under review the defendants paid the
to appeal.'
the
judgment to avoid the public sale of their property, the court considered
be moot. 299
to
not
appeal
the
therefore,
and
involuntary
be
to
payment
XVIII. LAW OF THE CASE

In State v. Owen, a criminal defendant faced a retrial after the
Supreme Court of Florida reversed his conviction due to its conclusion that
the defendant's confession was improperly admitted into evidence. 301 After
the reversal but before the retrial, the United States Supreme Court issued a
decision that demonstrated that the confession was admissible as a matter of
federal law. 0 2 The trial court refused a request by the state to reconsider the
admissibility of the confession in light of the new precedent. 0 3 The fourth
district denied the state's petition for certiorari review of the trial court's
order.30 4 The district court, however, certified the question of whether the
principles announced by the United States Supreme Court applied to the

294. Id. at 297-98 (quoting Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211,212 (Fla. 1992)).
295. 682 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
296. Id. at 222.
297. Id.
298. Id. (quoting Ronette Communications Corp. v. Lopez, 475 So. 2d 1360, 1360 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
299. Id. at 223.
300. 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
301. Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990).
302. Id (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 452 (1994)).
303. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.
304. State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). For a discussion of the
district court's decision in Owen, see 1993 Survey, supra note 1, at 33-34.
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admissibility of confessions in Florida courts. 0 5 After determining that the
Florida Constitution placed no greater restrictions on law enforcement than
those mandated under federal law, and that confessions of the sort with
which the case was concerned were admissible in Florida,3 0 6 the Supreme
Court of Florida faced the question of how the particular confession before
the court should be treated.
The court recognized that "[g]enerally, under the doctrine of the law of
the case, 'all questions of law which have been decided by the highest
appellate court become the law of the case which must be followed in
subsequent proceedings, both in the lower and appellate courts."' 30 8 The
court went on to note, however, that this "doctrine is not an absolute
mandate ' 30 9 and that the court "has the power to reconsider and correct
erroneous rulings in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the
previous decision would result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that
such rulings have become law of the case." 31° Since "[a]n intervening
decision by a higher court is one of the exceptional situations that this Court
311
will consider when entertaining a request to modify the law of the case"
and since, under the facts of the case, reliance on the prior decision "would
result in manifest injustice to the people of this state because it would
perpetuate a rule which [the court] determined to be an undue restriction of
legitimate law enforcement activity," the court quashed the district court's
decision and remanded with directions to grant the State's petition for
certiorari.312
However, the court refused the State's request that it reinstate the
convictions on the ground that a retrial is unnecessary in light of the court's
decision on the admissibility of the confession. 313 The court stated that its
prior decision, which reversed the convictions, was a "final decision that was
no longer subject to rehearing., 314 The court also indicated that with respect

305. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 202.
306. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 718-20.
307. Id. at 720.
308. Id. (quoting Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552
(Fla. 1984)).
309. Id. (citing Strazzaella v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1965)).
310. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720 (citing Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1984),
vacated, 564 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1990)).
311. Id. (citing Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552
(Fla. 1984); Strazulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965)).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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to the issue in question, the defendant stood in the315
same position as any other
defendant who had been charged but not yet tried.
An approach similar to that taken in Owen was utilized by the third
district in Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Viera.
There, while the case was
pending on remand after a reversal, the court decided another case en bane in
a manner that overruled the principle that had formed the basis for the
reversal.3 17 The court concluded that "this is one of the exceptional cases in
which we should reconsider the law of the case because to do otherwise
would work a manifest injustice. '318 The court therefore affirmed a trial
court order granting a new trial based on the en bane decision.319
Other cases in which courts found it aggropriate to depart from the law
of the case included: 1) Trotter v. State, in which the court stated that
"[a]n intervening act of the legislature refining a portion of Florida's death
penalty statute may be sufficiently exceptional to warrant" such an
approach;321 2) Zolache v. State,322 in which the court found that reliance on
a previous erroneous ruling would require the defendant to serve a sentence
in excess of that legally authorized;3 and 3) Horton v. State, in which a
previously argued claim that a county judge was improperly assigned to the
circuit court was proven to
325be meritorious by a subsequent decision of the
Supreme Court of Florida.
XIX. AFFIRMANCES WITHOUT OPINION

In Lowe Investment Corp. v. Clemente,326 the court denied a motion for
rehearing in a case that had been affirmed without opinion.32 7 In doing so,
the court discussed some of the reasons why cases are decided in such a
manner:

315. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720.
316. 693 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App.1997).
317. Id. at 1108.

318. Id.
319. Id.
at 1109.
320. 690 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.1996).

321. Id. at 1237.
322. 687 So. 2d 298 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct.App. 1997).

323. Id. at 300.
324. 682 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.1996).

325. Id. at 648.
326. 685 So.2d 84 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct. App. 1996).
327. Id. at 84. Indoing so, the court expressed some thoughts about the nature of
motions for rehearing. Id. at 85. That portion of the opinion is discussed in section XX of

this article.
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There are many reaso, s this court decides that a written opinion is
unnecessary when affirming a trial court. Usually, the panel of
judges considering the appeal agrees that no error occurred. It may
be that the claim of error involves the discretion of the trial judge
and the panel concludes that such was not abused. Or, the
perceived error was harmless. The considerations involved in
preparing written opinions were addressed in Whipple: "We write
opinions in all reversals and remands and, as noted, in affirmances
where we believe an opinion will make a substantial contribution to
the law, or where necessary to disclose conflict or certify
questions." 431 So. 2d at 1015-16. In addition, this court is
frequently presented with claims of error which were not properly
preserved at trial. Such a claim of error does not warrant a written
opinion because the law in this area is clear. This is the reason why
this appeal was affirmed-trial counsel failed to properly preserve
the error. 328
XX. REHEARING
In Goter v. Brown,3 29 the appellees presented in support of a motion for
rehearing a missing second page to an agreement that was at issue in the
case. 330 The page had not been previously presented to either the trial or the
appellate court.31 In its opinion on rehearing, the fourth district indicated
that had the page been presented to the trial court and accepted as the
controlling document, it would have ruled in the appellees' favor.332 In
denying rehearing, the court stated it had "little hesitancy in concluding that
this is all too late to change our initial decision. 333 The court expressed the
belief that it would be "starkly unfair to allow a party who has fought the
battle below and on appeal on one evidentiary basis, to be given leave to
fight it on appellate rehearing on quite a different one. 334 The court also
stated that even if there was no unfairness present, "it hardly needs
belaboring by us that none of this relates to something we overlooked or
misapprehended, the standards for rehearing on appeal.'

328. Lowe Inv. Corp., 685 So. 2d at 85. (quoting Whipple v. State, 431 So. 2d 1011,
1015-16 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
329. 682 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
330. Id. at 157.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 158.
334. Goter, 682 So. 2d at 158.
335. Id.
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Noting that much of the motion was in open defiance of the prohibition
against argument in such motions, the court also took the opportunity to
discuss the proper nature of rehearing requests. 336 The court stated that
"[m]otions for rehearing are strictly limited to calling our attention-without
argument-to something
we
have
obviously
overlooked
or
misapprehended. 3 37 Such a motion, the court continued, "is not a vehicle
for counsel or the party to continue its attempts at advocacy 338 but should be
"demonstrative only-i.e. merely point to the overlooked or misunderstood
fact or circumstance., 339 The court
"If we want additional
340 concluded:
argument, we knoN' how to say so."
The second district, in Lowe Investment Corp. v. Clemente, also
discussed rehearing motions. 341 There, the court affirmed the case without a
written opinion, and the appellant filed a motion for rehearing that asked the
court to reconsider one of the points previously briefed and argued.342
The court denied the motion, finding that it did not contain a point of
law or fact that the court overlooked or misapprehended,343 but used its
opinion doing so to express some thoughts regarding rehearing:
Motions for rehearing directed to this court are overused, if not
abused. See Whipple v. State, 431 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983). The motions seem to spring from a belief among some
attorneys that this court failed to understand the arguments, ignored
those same arguments, or worse, failed to consider the
arguments. None of these beliefs are valid, but certain advocates
seem to believe one of the above is the only explanation for their
loss on appeal. Some losing advocates, as here, apparently believe
that a request for rehearing has a better chance for success if
demanded in the strongest of terms. See Patton v. State Dep't. of
Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 597 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1991) ("We also understand that human emotions
occasionally cause such motions to be written with stronger

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Goter, 682 So. 2d at 158.
Id.
685 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
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rhetoric than is truly necessary or effective.") This is especially
34
true in cases where the court has not issued a written opinion.
XXI. MANDATE
About four and a half months after issuance of the mandate following
of court as the
the affirmance of an order, but •within the• same term
345
filed
a motion to
Corp.
v.
Seapine
in
Peter
affirmance, the appellants
3
court ruled,
the
appellate
expired
before
of
court
The
term
recall mandate.
court of
the
deprived
such
expiration
and the appellees contended that
347
that
finding
district
disagreed,
The fourth
jurisdiction to grant the motion.
as
the
of
court
same
term
within
the
motion
of
the
the timely filing
challenged judgment and mandate vested the court with jurisdiction. 3
XXI. ATTORNEYS' FEES

In U.S.B. Acquisition Co., v. Stamm, 349 a trial court on remand after an
affirmance on a main appeal and a reversal on a cross appeal aS° entered two
separate final orders awarding attorney's fees, one in favor of an attorney
who had handled the appeal and one in favor of the individual appellees for
their trial court attorney's fees. 351 The payor of the fees filed a single notice
of appeal directed to both orders3 52 and the appellate attorney filed a motion
under rule 9.400(c) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to review
the appellate fee award.353 The fourth district entered an order granting
review of the award of appellate fees and, upon such review, affirmed the
order.35 4 The payor moved for rehearing or clarification of that order, as
well as for consolidation with its pending appeal of the trial court fees,
arguing that the court's affirmance of the award had the effect of cutting off
the payor's separate appeal of the appellate fees award.35 5

344. Id. at 85. The court went on to discuss some of the reasons why cases might be
affirmed without opinion. Id. See section XIX of this article.
345. 678 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
346. Id. at 508.
347. Id.
at 509.
348. Id.
349. 695 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
350. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., v. Stamm, 660 So. 2d 1075 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
351. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 695 So. 2d at 373.
352. Id. at 374.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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Relyin on Magner v. Merrill Lynch Realty/MCK Inc.,356 and Starcher
v. Starcher, 5 the payor argued that it properly appealed the appellate fees
award, as opposed to seeking review by motion in the appellate court under
rule 9.400(c). 358 The court disagreed, stating that the principal holding of
Magner and Starcher "is that review of awards of appellate attorney's fees
after remand is strictly under rule 9.400(c), rather than by separate
appeal., 35 9 The court went on to indicate:
Properly read, Starcher and Magner recognize a very limited
exception to the command of rule 9.400(c) that applies only when
the same parties are involved in a single judgment after remand that
encompasses both an appellate fees issue and another issue, and
one party seeks review of both issues at the same time.360
This exception to the rule, the court continued, "does not apply when there
are multiple and discretely different judgments entered, and the appellate
fees issue involves a different party than the other issue determined on
remand. 36 '
The court also took the opportunity to discuss the purpose of rule
9.400(c):
There is, after all, an important policy behind rule 9.400(c).
Review by simple motion is far more expeditious and less costly
than review by plenary appeal. It is obviously the intent of the rule
to speed up what may very well be the last court determination in a
law suit, especially where it occurs after all trials and appeals have
been had, and the issue is the amount of the appellate lawyer's fee.
Society has an interest at the point in expediting the closing
judicial determination so that at long last finality and the end of
litigation are at hand. That is the singular mission of rule
9.400(c). 62
Also recognizing that review of appellate fee orders should be by
motion under Rule 9.400(c) was the decision in Pellar v. GrangerAsphalt

356. 585 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).

357. 430 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
358. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 695 So. 2d at 374.
359. Id. at 375.

360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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36336

Paving,Inc..
There, an appeal was taken from such an order.364 The first
district applied the principle set forth in rule 9.040(c) of the FloridaRules of
Appellate Procedure, which provides that "'[i]f a party seeks an improper
remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been
sought.' 365 The court then treated the notice of appeal as a motion for
review
of the
order
issue.366 The court also discussed the nature of review
by motion
under
ruleat9.400(c):
Rule 9.400(c) enables the parties to pursue a one-step method of
review that is more practical than an appeal and much less
expensive. The procedure does not require the payment of a filing
fee or the preparation of a formal record. Testimony and other
evidence before the trial court can be367
presented in an appendix to
the motion filed in the appellate court.
XXII. COSTS
In Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 368 the
court reviewed an order granting costs that were incurred by virtue of the
fact that a party's claims department was required to pay a nonrefundable
sum of money to its surety department as a premium for a supersedeas
bond. 369 The third district noted that the term "cost" is not defined by rule
37 ° which deals with
9.400 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,
appellate
court out
therefore
looked
to the
"plain
meaning ' ' costs.
371 and The
pointed
that costs
have
beenterm's
defined
to and
meanordinary
"'[a]n
amount paid or required in payment for a purchase; a price; ... [t]o cause to
lose, suffer or sacrifice .. .
Given this meaning, the court found that "[t]he term taxable 'costs' as
utilized in rule 9.400 then presupposes that the prevailing party on appeal
has sustained a loss of funds or incurred an expense by virtue of the
appellate process for which it is entitled to reimbursement by the losing

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

687 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 283.
Id. at 284 (quoting FLA. R. APp. P. 9.040(c)).
Id.
Id.
688 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at951.
Id. at 952.
Id.

372. Id. (quoting
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party. 373 Under the facts of the case, the court concluded that the party had
incurred no expenditure for bond premiums. 374 "The fact that one of its
department's budgets had to be debited for the benefit of another 375 did not
alter this conclusion because both of those departments were "7rt and
parcel of one company which is the only prevailing party on appeal."
In Vella V. Vella,377 the fourth district denied a motion for costs without
prejudice to refile the same motion in the trial court.378 The court wrote an
opinion on the matter because it had seen a large number of similar motions
and because of the need to address some
379 inappropriate language in the
court's prior opinion in Anderson v. State.
The court noted that rule 9.400(a) of the FloridaRules of Appellate
Procedure"expressly provides that the authority to tax costs in favor of the
prevailing party [on appeal] is vested in the trial court. 380 In Anderson,
however, the court had stated that .'[w]ithout permission from the appellate
court, the trial court cannot award appellate costs."' 381 Clarifying the matter
in Vella, the court stated that "[w]hat had become a headnote should now be
considered a dead note. 38 2
The Vella court went on to point out that the decision in Anderson also
quoted accurately from Boyer v. Boyer,383 a portion of that opinion which
indicates that rule 9.400(a) provides for taxation of costs on motions heard
within thirty days after issuance of the mandate. 384 In so doing, the Vella
court said
, , ,385"we perpetuated an error. The word 'heard' should have been

'served.

386
The second district, in FloridaPower & Light Co. v. Polackwich,
addressed the question of which party should pay for transcripts when both

373. Lone StarIndustries,688 So. 2d at 952.

374. Id.

375. Id.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id.
691 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
Id. at 612.
Id. (citing Anderson v. State, 632 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
Id (emphasis omitted).
Id. (quoting Anderson v. State, 632 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

1994)).
382. Vella, 691 So. 2d at 612.
383. 588 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
384. Vella, 691 So. 2d at 612 (citing Boyer v. Boyer, 588 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in Swartz v. Swartz, 691 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 3d

Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
385. Id.
386. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D626 (2d Dist. Ct. App. March 5, 1997).
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parties sought review and both prevailed on significant issues.
The case
reached the court on review of the trial court's denial of the appellant's
motion to tax costs, including a $37,500388cost for preparation of the record,
which included a lengthy trial transcript.
The court noted that "[w]hen both parties appeal and the cases are
consolidated, one party must be selected by the court to be the
appellant... [and that the selected party] has the initial responsibility to
obtain an adequate record on appeal."389 Frequently, the court pointed 'out,
the decision as to which party will be designated as the appellant "is based
on nothing more than the fact that one notice of appeal was the first to reach
the court. 3 90 Thus, the court indicated that "[t]here would be little sense in
a rule that forced that party to bear all the costs when both parties wished' 391
to
challenge the judgment and both parties prevailed on significant issues.
The court, therefore, reversed the order denying costs and remanded with
directions that the trial court "use its discretion to aportion the costs
between the parties so that each party pays its fair share."
The court stated
that "[f]airness suggests that the cost of that portion of the record needed by
both parties should be shared equally... [and that if there were portions]
that were necessary for only[those]
one of
the 3apeals, the party who lost that
costs."
appeal should probably bear
XXIV. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES

A.

OrdersReviewable in CriminalCases
1. Orders Reviewable by Appeal

Among the orders found to be reviewable by appeal were orders: 1)
imposing an unauthorized sentence of incarceration suspended in its entirely
on the condition that the defendant successfully complete community
control; 394 2) withholding adjudication of guilt, but not placing a defendant

387. Id. at D626.

388. Id.
389. Id. at D627 (citing FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200(a)(2)(e)).

390. Id.
391.
392.
393.
394.
31, 1997).

Polackwich, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D627.

Id.
Id.
State v. McEachern, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D323, D324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Jan.
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on probation; 395 3) striking a restitution requirement from a probation
order;3 96 and 4) denying a petition for a writ of prohibition alleging the
denial of a speedy trial in county court.397
2. Orders Not Reviewable by Appeal
Among the orders found not to be reviewable on appeal were orders: 1)
denying a motion for postconviction relief as to seven grounds, when the
398
trial court also granted a belated appeal from the challenged conviction;
and 2) denying a motion for case reassignment.3 99
3. Orders Reviewable by Certiorari
Among the orders found to be reviewable by certiorari were orders: 1)

requiring disclosure of a confidential informant's identity; 400 2) suppressing
evidence of a defendant's medical treatment records for a sexually
transmitted disease; 40 1 3) dismissing an appeal to a circuit court on the

ground that the order in question was not appealable;40 2 4) determining the
admissibilitv
of hearsay evidence; 40 3 and 5)
40 ,r
evidence.
B.

excluding similar fact

State Appeals after JeopardyAttaches
In State v. Livingston,4°1 the defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress

certain evidence and statements. Pursuant to an agreement by all concerned,
395. Waite v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 681 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
396. State v. Hitchmon, 678 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
397. Loftis v. State, 682 So. 2d 632, 633 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
398. Gordon v. State, 688 So. 2d 995, 995 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
399. Ortiz v. State, 689 So. 2d 353, 353 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
400. State v. Roberts, 686 So. 2d 722, 722 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
401. State v. Issac, 696 So. 2d 813, 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
402. Johnson v. State, 683 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Garrepy v.
State, 679 So. 2d 353, 353-54 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996), cause dismissed, 687 So. 2d
1303 (Fla. 1997).
403. State v. Skolar, 692 So. 2d 309, 309 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 1997).
404. State v. Dennis, 696 So. 2d 848, 848 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
405. 681 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Although not reflected in the
Southern Reporter, the opinion in Livingston was issued upon the appellee's motion for
rehearing. State v. Livingston, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D2041 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. Sept. 11,
1996). It was substituted for a prior opinion that had been reported at 21 Fla. L. Weekly

Published by NSUWorks, 1997

47

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3

Nova Law Review

[Vol 22:29

the motions were not heard until after a jury was selected and sworn.40 6 The
trial court granted the motions and subsequently granted a mistrial, despite
40
1
the fact that the defendant neither moved for nor consented to the mistrial.
The State appealed from the suppression orders and the second district
reversed. 40 8 Rather than remand for further proceedings, however, the court
remanded with directions to discharge the defendant.
The court pointed
out that in most cases, suppression motions can be easily disposed of prior
to trial.10 "[W]hen the judge rules at trial to suppress evidence," however,
the court continued, "the state is foreclosed from appealing that decision
unless the defendant moves for a mistrial, consents to one, or by his conduct
causes one." 4 11 Since "jeopardy [had] attached when the jury was sworn,
and since none of these circumstances [were] present in the record, [the
court concluded that] the state lost its right to prosecute the [defendant] any
further [once the mistrial was declared]."
C.

Review of Sentences

The Supreme Court of Florida, in Franquiz v. State,413 clarified the
remedy that appellate courts should apply when trial courts fail to provide
written reasons for downward departures from the sentencing guidelines
upon revocation of probation or community control in instances in which the
initial placement on probation or community control was a downward
departure based on a plea agreement.4 14 The court concluded that cases in
which the sentence was imposed prior to the date of the Franquiz decision
(October 10, 1996), 4' s should be "remanded and the trial court given the
option of a downward departure revocation sentence with proper written
reasons for the departure." 416 Sentences imposed after the date of the
opinion are to be "remand[ed] with direction that the defendant be allowed

D1237 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. May 22, 1996), and it contains extensive changes from the
earlier opinion. For a discussion of the initial opinion that was withdrawn by the court, see
1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 52-53.
406. Livingston, 681 So. 2d at 762.
407. Id. at 764.
408. Id. at 765.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 764-65.
411. Livingston, 681 So. 2d at 765.
412. Id.
413. 682 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1996).
414. Id. at 537.
415. Id. at 536.
416. Id. at 538.
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to withdraw a plea made conditioned
upon the departure sentence or be
417
sentenced within the guidelines."
D. Death Penalty Cases
In State v. Fourth District Court of Appeal,418 the Supreme Court of
Florida dealt with a petition for mandamus that sought to require the Fourth
District Court of Appeal to transfer to the supreme court a prohibition
petition filed by a death row inmate. 419 The inmate had filed a motion for
postconviction relief in the trial court and moved to disqualify the
judge. 420 After the motion was denied, the inmate sought prohibition in the
fourth district.421 In granting the State's mandamus request and ordering the
case transferred, the supreme court held that "in addition to our appellate
jurisdiction over sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review
all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases." 422 The court
limited its holding, however, by noting that its jurisdiction in this regard
"does not include cases in which the death penalty is sought but not yet
imposed... or cases in which we have vacated both the conviction and
sentence of death and remanded for a new trial." 423
XXV. APPEALS IN JUVENILE CASES
424

In I T. v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida dealt with the question
of how appellate courts should dispose of cases in which they find that the
evidence is insufficient with regard to the offense for which the juvenile was
adjudicated, but is sufficient with regard to a permissive lesser included
offense. 425 The court found that section 924.34 of the Florida Statutes,
which requires appellate courts dealing with similar circumstances in
criminal cases to direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser
426
offense,
applies
to juvenile
delinquency
cases.
went
on toonly
reject
a contention
that
the statutory
provision
should The
be court
read to
apply
to

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

Id.
697 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at70.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71.

423. Fourth Dist. Court ofAppeal, 697 So. 2d at 71.

424. 694 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1997).
425. Id. at 721.
426. Id. at 722 (citing FLA. STAT. § 924.34 (1995)).
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necessarily lesser included offenses. 427 Thus, although the adjudications
under review in . T were ordered vacated due to the wording of the charging
document, 428 the case demonstrates that in the absence of such unique
circumstances, appellate courts finding sufficient evidence as to either a
necessary or permissive lesser included offense should remand the case for
the entry of an adjudication of delinquency for that lesser offense.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Z.F. v. State,4 2 9 dealt with a
situation in which the parents of a juvenile who had been convicted in the
court below were not indigent and decided not to proceed with an appeal.430
The court noted that section 27.52 (2)(d), FloridaStatutes, provides:
A nonindigent parent or legal guardian of a dependent person
under the age of 18 years shall furnish such person with the
necessary legal services and costs incident to a delinquency
proceeding in which the person has a right to legal counsel under
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the
State of Florida.43
The court conceded that the statutory provision includes appeals and
permits the court to appoint either the Public Defender or a private attorney
432
to appeal and to assess costs of up to $1,250 against the parents.
However, the court focused on the question of whether an appeal constitutes
"necessary legal services. 4 33 The court asked "Who should determine what
is a necessary legal service?, 434 The court noted that parents may feel, after
hearing the testimony, that the child would benefit more by admitting a
mistake and getting on with his or her life or that the matter is so
unimportant to the child's future that the family would benefit more from
using the money it cost to appeal for other purposes. 435
The court recognized, however, that a conflict could exist if, for
example, the parents are the victims of the child's crime, or that the child
could
be innocent
such
circumstances
it would
seema
inappropriate
to denyand
the that
child436under
an appeal,
especially
if the youth
may have

427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 724.
Id.
683 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1084 (citing FLA. STAT. § 27.52(2)(d) (1995)).
Id. at 1085.

Id.
ZF., 683 So. 2d at 1085.

Id.
Id.
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79

legitimate appeal on an important issue that may dramatically affect his or
her future, but have parents who choose not to appeal solely for financial
considerations.4 37
Balancing these factors, the court set forth the appropriate procedure for
trial courts to follow in such situations:
We submit that when the court announces the defendant's right to
appeal (or as soon thereafter as practical so that if a guardian ad
litem is appointed, he or she can make a recommendation within
the 30-day appeal period), it should determine whether the juvenile
is entitled to the appointment of an attorney under the statute. If it
appears that the parents are nonindigent, the court should solicit the
views of the trial attorney and the parents as to whether an appeal
would constitute "necessary legal services." If the court has any
doubt, it should remove the parents as the decision maker on this
issue and appoint a guardian ad litem in their place. If the court
determines that an appeal is a "necessary legal service," then an
attorney should be appointed for that purpose. If the court finds
that an appeal, under the circumstances of the case, is not
necessary, then it should decline to appoint an attorney. In that
event, no Notice of Appeal will be automatically filed. If an
attorney files an appeal without proper appointment, then a
a fee, if a fee is expected, is the attorney's
recovery of 43
responsibility. 8
XXVI. APPEALS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES
In Hill v. Division of Retirement,439 the first district wrote an opinion
"to describe the essential attributes of reviewable final orders entered under
the Administrative Procedure Act."440 The court stated:
Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.190(b), review of
final agency action begins with the filing of a notice of appeal, in
accordance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(c),
instead of with the filing of a petition for review of a preliminary,

437.
438.
439.
440.

Id.
Id.
687 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1377.
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procedural, or intermediate order, in accordance with Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.100(b) and (c)."
"Review of final agency action taken under the Administrative Procedure
Act is, moreover, a matter of right," 442the court continued, while "[o]n the
other hand, immediate review of a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
of the final agency
agency action or ruling is available only 'if review
4 43
decision would not provide an adequate remedy.',
The court went on to note that: 1) final orders in proceedings affecting
"'substantial interests must be in writing and include findings of fact, if any,
has not
and conclusions of law separately stated[;]'444 and 2) that an agency 445
rendered a final order until the order is "'filed with the agency clerk.'
The court indicated that "[f]inal agency action may take the form of an
446
order whether 'affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory' in tenor"
and that "[a] final agency order may articulate jurisdictional boundaries;
require a party to cease or desist; grant, suspend, or revoke a license; impose
an administrative penalty deny an evidentiary hearing; or deny substantive
relief of various kinds." 4 Additionally, the court recognized that "[a] final
order may448or may not dismiss a petition for hearing or some other
pleading.,
The court summed up its discussion by concluding that the finality of an
order "depends on whether it has brought the administrative adjudicative
process to a close.

449

In W.T Holding, Inc. v. State,45 ° the fourth district found that the
reissuance of a final order by an administrative agency is appropriate when a
party does not receive a copy of the order until after the time for appeal has
elapsed.45 '
The first district, in Libby Investigations v. Department of State,452
rejected an argument that an appellate court cannot reverse an agency's
decision to increase the penalty suggested in a hearing officer's

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (Supp. 1996)).
Hill, 687 So. 2d at 1377 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.569(2)0) (Supp. 1996)).
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.52(7) (Supp. 1996)).
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.52(7) (Supp. 1996)).
Id.
Id.
Hill, 687 So. 2d at 1377.
682 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 1225.
685 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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recommended order as long as the penalty is within the limits permitted by
the applicable statute.453
XXVII. APPEALS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES
•

454

In Hastings v. Demming, the Supreme Court of Florida answered a
certified question by indicating that "[n]onfinal orders denying summary
judgment on a claim of workers' compensation immunity are not appealable
unless the trial court's order specifically states that, as a matter of law, such
a defense is not available to a party.' ' 5 The court stated that "[i]n those
limited cases, the party is precluded from having a jury decide whether a
plaintiff's remedy is limited to workers' compensation benefits and,
therefore, an appeal is proper."456 In other than those limited cases, the court
noted that "the denial of the summary judgment may be based on a factual
dispute and the party is still likely able to present an immunity defense to the
jury. 457 The court also pointed out that prior to its decision, it had amended
the appellate rules to address this matter,45 and that "the new rule makes
courts have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the
clear that the district
' 9
nonfinal order. As
The change in the appellate rules discussed in Hastings was held in
Stucki v. Hopkins,460 to apply retroactively to summary judgments entered
6
prior to its effective date. 46
In Betancourt v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,462 the first district set forth the
guidelines for determining whether the court has jurisdiction to consider an
appeal in cases in which a judge of compensation claims ("JCC") fails to
rule on a claim that is ripe for adjudication and that is properly before the
JCC. 46 3 The court found that "[i]n cases wherein a JCC expressly reserves
jurisdiction on a fully tried issue that is ripe for adjudication, such
reservation renders the order nonfinal and nonappealable., 464 Therefore,

453.
454.
455.
456.

Id. at 71.
694 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 720.
Id.

457. Id.
458. See section II(E) of this article.
459. Hastings,694 So. 2d at 720.
460. 691 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

461.
462.
463.
464.

Id. at 562.
693 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 681.
Id at 682.
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other hand, the court stated:
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On the

In cases in which the JCC fails to enter a ruling on a fully tried
issue that is ripe for adjudication and does not reserve jurisdiction
on the issue, this court will consider the absence of a ruling to
constitute a denial of the claim only for jurisdictional purposes, and
the order will, therefore, be deemed final and appealable.
In considering the merits of such cases, the "court will continue to consider
the JCC's failure to rule reversible error based on the JCC's noncompliance
with the duty to adjudicate all issues that are ripe for adjudication.' '4 7 The
court went on to indicate that "in regard to cases involving claims that are
ripe for adjudication at the time of the hearing, for which claimant failed to
produce evidence or obtain a ruling, this court will consider the claim
abandoned and the issue waived, and will consider the order final and
appealable. ,0468 As to such matters, "[a]ny subsequent469claim for the same
benefits will be barred by the principle ofresjudicata.,
In reaching its decision, the court "recognize[d] that motions for
rehearing in workers' compensation cases do not toll the time to appeal,
unlike those in other classes of cases., 47 ' Noting that it is "of the firm
conviction that much of the uncertainty that attends orders which fail to
address mature claims could be remedied by the adoption of an amended
rehearing rule that would allow the filing of a timely motion to toll the time
for appeal,, 471 the court "therefore commend[ed] to the Workers'
Compensation Rules Committee of The Florida Bar the adoption of an
amended rehearing rule for the purpose of achieving the above stated
goal. 47 2
XXVIII. APPEALS INFAMILY LAW CASES

The fifth district in In re JA.,473 joined the third and fourth districts474
in holding that court-appointed counsel in appeals from orders terminating
465. Id.

466. Id.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Betancourt,693 So. 2d at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.

471. Id.
472. Betancourt,693 So. 2d at 683.
473. 693 So. 2d 723 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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parental rights, who find there to exist no issues of arguable merit, are not
required to follow the procedure set forth in Anders v. California475 for use
in similar
circumstances by court-appointed counsel involved in criminal
4 76
cases.

XXIX. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
A.

Prohibition

The fifth district, in Rollins v. Baker,477 granted a petition for a writ of
prohibition that sought the disqualification of a trial judge in a pending
case.478 Although the court found prohibition warranted as to the merits of
the petitioner's claim, it also noted the existence of an additional ground for
disqualification, 479 the fact the judge had "filed a pro se response to the
court's order to show cause" in which he went beyond stating his position as
to why the petition was legally insufficient,48 and commented on facts not
alleged in the petition or the underlying motion to disqualify, tried to explain
4 81
his actions, and attempted to correct or explain allegations in the petition.
The court suggested that when judges are "confronted with the dilemma 48of2
whether or not to respond to a show cause order in these types of cases[,]
[p]erhaps the best course of action is to request the attorney general's office
to file a response on behalf of thejudge
limited to the legal sufficiency of the
4
facts set forth by the petitioner."
4 84 a trial judge was represented by the attorney
In Ellis v. Henning,
general's office in a prohibition proceeding, but the ultimate result was the
same as the result in Rollins. 481 In Ellis, the fourth district concluded that it
was compelled to grant a writ of prohibition "because the responses, filed on
behalf of the trial judge by an assistant attorney general in each of the
474. See Jimenez v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 669 So. 2d 340,
341 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Ostrum v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs.,
663 So. 2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). For a discussion of the opinions in
Jimenez and Ostrum, see 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 59-61.

475. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
476. JA., 693 So. 2d at 724.
477. 683 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
478. Id. at 1139.

479. Id.at 1139-40.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

Id.at 1140.
Id.
Rollins, 683 So. 2d at 1140.
Id.
678 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 827.
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consolidated cases, imperrissibly took issue with the accuracy of the
allegations in the petition.,' S6
The court "recognize[d] that the trial judge may have merely referred
this case to the attorney general's office for a response as judges frequently
do[,], 487 and indicated that "[i]t is thus also the responsibility of the office of
the attorney general as the judge's representative not to file a response on the
judge's behalf, which, as in this case, requires the judge's
disqualification. ' 488 The court reiterated a warning it had expressed in
Fabber v. Wessel,489 "that it is the safer practice 'for the
490 judge to remain
silent and let the adversarial party supply the response."'
The Ellis court granted the trial judge's motion for clarification to
address the concern "that a failure to respond could result in the issuance of
a writ of prohibition if a respondent judge follows [the court's] advice and
remains silent., 49 1 The court pointed out that "[t]his concern arises only in
those cases where the adversarial party-for whatever reason-also does not
respond[,] ' '492 and that "[i]n practical terms, there may be those times that
both parties desire that anotherjudge
hear the case or where an adversarial
49
party simply fails to respond., 3
Also, the court on clarification discussed its caution to the assistant
attorney general, indicating that its "concern was that a response, which
contests the accuracy of the facts alleged by a petitioner, impermissibly
places the trial judge in an adversarial posture."4494 The court noted that,
"[o]n the other hand, nothing prevents the assistant attorney general, on
behalf of the trial judge, from limiting a response to the legal sufficiency of
the facts set forth by the petitioner., 49 The court went on to state that "[t]he
respondent simply4 must avoid the temptation to dispute the facts if a
response is filed"96 and that "[i]n the overwhelming majority of the cases,
the office of the attorney general has struck the necessary balance. 497

486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 827-28.
489. 604 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
490. Ellis, 678 So. 2d at 828 (quoting Fabber v. Wessel, 604 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Ellis, 678 So. 2d at 828.
496. Id.
497. Id.
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The Effect on Appeals of PriorDenials ofProhibition

In Hobbs v. State,498 a criminal defendant appealed to the fourth district
from his conviction asserting that he was improperly denied discharge on
speedy trial grounds. 499 The defendant had raised the speedy trial issue in a
pretrial petition for a writ of prohibition which the fourth district had denied
without opinion.500 The State asserted that the denial of prohibition
constituted the law of the case and that relitigation of the issue on appeal
was therefore barred. 0°
The court noted that in Petrullo v. Petrullo, 50 2 it had stated that a
"denial of a writ without opinion cannot be the law of the case. 5 °3 The
court recognized that Petrullo dealt with a petition for prohibition, but
pointed out that the only authority it had cited for its statement was Bing v.
A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,504 a case that involved the denial without
opinion of a petition for certiorari.50 5
The court then discussed the difference between the two extraordinary
writs by noting that the vast majority of petitions for certiorari are dismissed
because the petitioner has an adequate remedy on appeal and that no matter
how clear the error of a trial judge may be, an appellate court has no
jurisdiction so long as an adequate remedy existed on appeal. 0 6 The court
continued, "[t]here is no similar jurisdictional hurdle, separate and apart
from the propriety of the action of the trial
50 7 court, when an appellate court
reviews a petition for writ of prohibition.,
The court went on to cite the specially concurring opinion of Judge
Anstead in DeGennaro v. Janie Dean Chevrolet, Inc., which asserted
that unless an order on opinion denying prohibition indicates to the contrary,
such a ruling should constitute the law of the case because "[j]udicial

498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

689 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
Id at 1249.
Id.
Id.
604 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 538.
498 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1250.
Id.
Id.
Judge Anstead is currently a Supreme Court of Florida Justice.
600 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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efficiently allocated when they
resources, already heavily taxed, are hardly
'5
are used to twice review the same issue.
Opting to follow the approach adopted by the third district in Obanion
v. State, the Hobbs court concluded that "[h]enceforth a denial of a
petition for writ of prohibition will be a ruling on the merits, unless we state
otherwise. ' 51 2
The court adopted this approach despite recognizing that the supreme
court, in Barwick v. State,5 13 "although approving the procedure which we
adopt from Obanion, adopted the opposite approach for itself, announcing
that if a denial of a petition for writ of prohibition is intended to foreclose
further review
on direct appeal, the order will state that it is with
5 14
prejudice."
The court did not, however, discuss its previous decision in Thomason
v. State,15 in which Judge Farmer, who joined in the unanimous en banc
Hobbs decision, wrote a dissenting opinion that expressed disagreement with
the Obanion approach.516

510. Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1250 (quoting DeGennaro v. Janie Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 600
So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Anstead, J., specially concurring)).
511. 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
512. Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1251.
513. 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 823 (1996). For a discussion
of the opinion in Barwick, see 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 40-42.
514. Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1250, n.2.
515. 594 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed on other grounds, 620 So.
2d 1234 (Fla. 1993).
516. In Thomason, the defendant, who was appealing from an order withholding
adjudication and placing him on probation, raised a double jeopardy claim that he had
previously asserted in a petition for prohibition that had been denied without opinion. Id.
The court affirmed without opinion, but Judge Farmer, who wrote primarily to dissent on the
merits, discussed the question of whether consideration of the double jeopardy claim was
proper in light of the prior petition. Id. at 312 (Farmer, J., dissenting). He noted that such
consideration was appropriate because prohibition is an extraordinarily prerogative writ that is
sometimes denied for "good reasons having nothing to do with the underlying merits of [a
petitioner's] position ....
" Id. at 312 n.2. He recognized that his view was contrary to
Obanion, but stated that the fourth district had never adopted the Obanion approach and that
he hoped it never would, "at least as long as prohibition is deemed a matter of mere grace."
Id. Although disagreeing with Judge Farmer on the merits of the case, it appears that the other
members of the panel agreed with him on the jurisdictional issue because the case was
affirmed, rather than dismissed, Thomason, 594 So. 2d at 310, because Judge Stone wrote a
specially concurring opinion that set forth the reasons why he felt the case should be affirmed
on the merits, and because the court, on rehearing, certified a question that dealt only with the
merits of the case. Id. at 318.
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Mandamus

In Van Meter v. Singletary, 517 an inmate sought review of a circuit court
order dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus, which had challenged a
loss of gain time imposed upon a finding that the inmate had committed a
disciplinary infraction.5 18 The petition had been dismissed because it was
filed some six months after his administrative appeal was affirmed 19 and
because section 95.11(8), of the FloridaStatutes, states that any court action
challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings must be commenced within
thirty days after final disposition of the proceeding. 2 Finding the statutory
provision to be an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers, the first district reversed the order of dismissal.522 Relying on a
long line of precedent from the Supreme Court of Florida, the first district
held that the Florida Constitution vested in the courts the complete power to
issue extraordinary writs and "that the legislature was prohibited from
interfering with that power in any way. 523 The court recognized that rule
1.630(c) of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure provides that requests for
extraordinary writs "other than common law certiorari must be filed within
the time provided by law,, 524 but was "unwilling to presume that the
supreme court," in enacting the rule "intended so cavalierly to surrender to
the legislature a power which it had zealously guarded for so long. 5 25 The
court thus interpreted the rule "to refer to the judicially developed law
regarding the time within which such relief must be sought-i.e., the concept
of laches. '26
D.

Certiorari

In Stilson v. Allstate Insurance Co.,527 the second district denied a
petition for a writ of certiorari that sought review of a circuit court appellate
decision, "reluctantly conclud[ing] that [it was] faced with an error that [it]
517. 682 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 696 So. 2d 342

(Fla. 1997).
518. Id. at 1163.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 1164.

522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.

Van Meter, 682 So. 2d at 1165.
Id.at 1164.
Id at 1164-65.
Id. at 1165.
Id.
692 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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lack[ed] the discretion to correct. 5 28 The court found that the county court
had improperly granted summary judgment, but declined to disturb the
affirmance without written opinion by the circuit court. 529 The district
court's determination was based on the limited standard of review that
applies when district courts review decisions of circuit courts acting in their
appellate capacity.53 °
The court noted that "certiorari should not be used as a vehicle for a
second appeal in a typical case tried in county court., 531 Rather, the court
continued, district courts must be guided by decisions of the supreme
court 532 that "[i]n essence.., cautioned the district courts to be prudent and
deliberate when deciding to exercise this extraordinary power but not so
wary as to deprive litigants and the public of essential justice."
The second district recognized that "the departure from the essential
requirements of the law necessary for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is
something more than a simple legal error 534 and that district courts should
use their discretion to correct an error "only when there has been a violation
of [a]
clearly established principle of law•• resulting in a miscarriage, of
••
,,535
justice.
The court stated that the error in the case before it was "[a]t
worst 536 a misapplication of the correct law and "not sufficient by itself to
be a miscarriage ofjustice. ' 3
The court noted that there may never be clearly established principles of
law governing a wide range of county court issues because "[i]t is difficult
for the law to evolve in unreported decisions issued in circuit court
appeals." 538Therefore, the court admitted to "a great temptation in a case like
this one to announce a 'miscarriage of justice' simply to provide precedent
where precedent is needed., 539 However, the court resisted the temptation
because it did not interpret Heggs as giving it that degree of discretion and

528. Id. at 983.
529. Id. at 980.
530. Id. at 982.
531. Id.
532. Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 982 (citing Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.
2d 523 (Fla. 1995); Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)). For a discussion of the
decision in Heggs, see 1995: Survey, supra note 1, at 31-2.
533. Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 982.
534. Id.
535. Id. (quoting Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla.
1995) (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 95-96 (Fla. 1983))).
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 982.
539. Id. at 983.
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because "[s]uch an interpretation would invite certiorari review of a large
number of appellate decisions issued by circuit courts. 540
As a possible solution to the problem, the court pointed to section
541
34.017(1) of the FloridaStatutes, which permits county court's to certify
to district courts of appeal questions that may have statewide application and
that either are of "great public importance" or will "affect the uniform
The second district indicated that "[c]ounty
administration of justice."
court judges should understand that this provision can be used to create
543
precedent needed for the orderly administration of justice in their courts,
and that the district court "rel[ies] upon them to screen their cases so that the
an occasional appeal rather than numerous
district courts may receive
544
petitions for certiorari.",
The first district in Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v.
Smith,545 reviewed a circuit court order that had granted certiorari and
reversed an order suspending a driver's license. 46 The appendix to the
petition in the circuit court did not include a conformed copy of the order to
be reviewed. 4 7 The first district found that this fact alone demonstrated that
the circuit court could not have applied the correct law, and that it could not
have determined whether the findings of the order under review were
supported by competent substantial evidence.5 4 8 Relying both on those
conclusions and a finding that the circuit court reweighed the evidence in its
ruling on the merits the district court granted certiorari and quashed the

circuit court's order.?49
E. Habeas Corpus

The Supreme Court of Florida, in Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention
Center v. TO.,055 dealt with a situation in which a juvenile was detained
pursuant to a detention order issued by a circuit court located within the
territorial jurisdiction of the fifth district.551 The place of detention,

540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 34.017(1) (1995).
Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 983 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 34.017(1) (1995)).
Id.
Id.
687 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996) [hereinafterAlachua II].
Id. at 815.
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52
however, was located within the territorial jurisdiction of the first district.
After the juvenile's motion for release was denied by the circuit court, he
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the first district. 5 3 In granting
relief, the first district certified to the supreme court as a question of great
public importance the question of whether, in light of the fact that the order
detaining the juvenile was entered by a circuit court located in another
district, it was the proper court to consider the petition. 54
The court said that "it appears that a district court of appeal does not
have the constitutional power to issue a writ directed to a person outside the
'
district court's territorial jurisdiction."555
Further, "the proper respondent in
a habeas corpus petition is the party that has actual custody and is in a
position to physically produce the petitioner., 556 The supreme 5 court
57
concluded that "the Fifth District Court could not have issued the writ.
The Supreme Court of Florida went on to consider the question of
whether the first district, "not having supervisory or appellate jurisdiction
over the.., court" that issued the detention order, "had the authority to
review its detention order. 558 In concluding that the first district did have
such jurisdiction, the supreme court pointed out certain restrictions apply
under such circumstances. 59 When a court entertaining a habeas corpus
petition does not have supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the court
that entered the order or other process under challenge, the supreme court
concluded that "the scope of the reviewing court's inquiry is limited to
whether the court that entered the order was without jurisdiction to do so or
whether the order is void or illegal., 560 The supreme court further found that
"[t]he reviewing court may not discharge the detainee if the detention order
is merely defective, irregular, or insufficient in form or substance. 56'

XXX. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
In May of 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida Judicial Management
Council ("JMC") Committee on Appellate Court Workload & Jurisdiction
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. T.O. v. Alachua Reg'l Juvenile Detention Ctr., 668 So. 2d 243, 245 (Fla 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1996), decision approved,684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996) [hereinafter Alachua ]].
555. Alachua I, 684 So. 2d at 816.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Alachua II, 684 So. 2d at 816.
561. Id.
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produced a draft report that may well impact on the future of appellate
practice in Florida. "The JMC asked the committee to review the
jurisdiction, workload, resources, and case management practices of the
district courts of appeal, and make recommendations on alternative
approaches that allow the courts to meet anticipated workload levels." 562
The committee summarized its recommendations as follows:
Adopt a new appellate court workload standard of 225 dispositions
after submission on the merits per judge (committee voted 8 in
favor, 2 opposed);
In combination with the above, adopt an additional appellate court
workload standard of 385 case filings per judge (committee voted 6
in favor, 2 opposed, 2 abstaining);
This committee should develop, for court approval, a uniform
method of counting cases prior to, or concurrent with, efforts to
develop performance-based budgeting (committee voted 9 in favor,
0 opposed, 0 abstaining);
Redistribute administrative appeals and workers' compensation
cases to the district courts of appeal in which the matters arose,
with the exception of broad rule-making activities by state agencies
(committee voted 8 in favor, 0 opposed, 2 abstaining);
Move the 8th Judicial Circuit from the 1st District Court of Appeal
to the 5th District Court of Appeal and move the 20th Judicial
Circuit from the 2nd District Court of Appeal to the 3rd District
Court of Appeal (committee voted 7 in favor, 2 opposed, 0
abstaining);
Balancing district court of appeal workload by combining the
recommendations concerning redistributing administrative appeals
and workers' compensation jurisdiction with geographic changes
(committee voted 9 in favor, 1 opposed, 0 abstaining);
Do not create an additional district court of appeal at this time but
revisit this issue in five years (committee voted 5 in favor, 4
opposed, 0 abstaining);
Do not create specialized appellate courts (committee voted 7 in
favor, 0 opposed, 3 abstaining);

562. Report of the JMC Committee on Appellate Court Workload & Jurisdiction, May,
1997, at 1.
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Subject-matter divisions should remain an option available to each
district court of appeal to establish as it sees fit (committed voted 7
in favor, 1 opposed, 1 abstaining);
Severely limit the availability of appeals from non-final orders
(committee voted 6 in favor, 3 opposed, 1 abstaining);
The use of senior judges as additional appellate resources, not just
as replacements in individual cases, should be encouraged and
funded (committee voted 9 in favor, 0 opposed, 0 abstaining); and
The use of central staff attorneys should be within the discretion of
each district court of appeal, but they are not the alternative to
additional judges (committee voted 9 in favor, 0 opposed, 0
abstaining).563
The Florida Courts Technology Commission is presently considering
recommending to the supreme court the adoption of a vendor neutral citation
system that would include the sequential numbering and paragraph
numbering of opinions from the supreme court and the district courts of
appeal. Clearly, the adoption of such a system would significantly affect all
Florida lawyers, particularly appellate practitioners.
Of course, the courts over the coming year will provide answers to
many of the questions raised by the cases discussed in this article. These
answers, as they frequently do, will likely generate new questions. These
questions, and others, will continue to provide the large number of court
decisions that shape the field of appellate practice.

563. Report at 1-2.
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